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Introduction: The Tensions of French Republicanism

A Short Historical Contextualization
In this thesis, I will investigate France’s colonial past in North Africa, specifically in
Algeria. The complex relationship between these two countries both during France’s
occupation and after decolonization, has had significant impacts on racial, religious, and
nationalist tensions in France today. I argue increased xenophobia, islamophobia, and racism
in France have stemmed from the failure on the part of society (in the realms of politics,
education, religion, and economics) to address this historical legacy. I will examine the
process of Algeria’s liberation and France’s efforts to thwart revolution, leading to the
strenuous and long Algerian War (1954-1962). Today we can see many of the systems of
discrimination that were in place in colonial Algeria recreating themselves in modern day
France. These systems have been emboldened further by a national and global fear
mongering in the wake of the recent Muslim extremist terrorist attacks in Paris, Nice, and
many other European cities. The national and public reaction to these events and to France’s
current immigration dilemma is rooted in its current and former relationship with Algeria. In
effect, I argue that Algerian colonial history defines and informs France’s current national
identity crisis and the rise of extreme right-wing hate groups.
During the late 1800s through the late 1900s, France was one of the great European
imperialist powers. Its territories dotted the globe, and even today it is the country whose
territories cover the most time zones in the world. North Africa, or the Maghreb (which
includes Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), was the site of some of France’s most lucrative and
close-to-home colonies. Algeria was considered “the door” to the Third-World and the
“jewel” of France’s territorial possessions. The colony was a site of mass trade and valuable
in its natural resources and market opportunities. Algeria also became a perfect site for
French tourism, with the appeal of “exotic” African adventures and the mystique of the
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Muslim Kasbah. But rather than admitting to the real motivation behind the colonization and
occupation of North Africa, French authorities proselytized la mission civilisatrice, or the
narrative that France should bestow its civilization upon corners of the globe that were “less
enlightened.” The teaching of “Frenchness” on the levels of language, culture, and history
was central to this project and carried out through assimilation processes, both subtly and
overtly. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, a worldwide anti-imperialist movement
gained traction in many French colonial territories leading to a cascade of liberation
movements. Anti-colonial literature and theory, in addition to news coverage of revolutions
elsewhere, began to permeate Algerian society and spark revolutionary action.
The process of liberation was fraught with controversies and forced France to decide
whether it considered its colonies a part of itself, or whether they were somehow separate,
populated with individuals who were not considered full citizens of the Republic. In the
1960s, Algeria finally became an independent country and its decolonization would have
long-lasting and irreversible effects for Algerians, for the Pieds-Noirs (French settlers living
in Algeria), for Algerian migrants and their descendants who moved to, and now live in
mainland France, and for the “purebred French” (Français de souche) who were and are still
not ready to face an increasingly multicultural society largely resulting from colonial history.
In addition, the crimes committed against humanity on both sides of the Mediterranean
during the war led to an extremely rocky and bitter separation. On the world stage, France
was criticized for its hypocrisy -- the country of liberté, égalité and fraternité could not
exclude the rights of North Africans to independence, could not restrict the rights of
Muslims, and could not murder and torture protesters, both at home and abroad. In
metropolitan France, Algeria was criticized for its mutiny and violence -- many French
citizens considered the revolution a betrayal of epic proportion in light of the many “benefits”
France had supplied to North Africa.

Brown 6
Following independence, Algeria entered a period of instability and economic
hardship leading to a wave of immigration to France. Algerian citizens, many of whom were
francophone and understood French culture as part of their lives, left their country hoping to
find opportunity in France. In addition, France invited members of its colonies to help rebuild
its infrastructure after World War II, which had left it devastated. This immigrant population
became the low paid work force needed in the metropole and as a result, its population of
African Muslims began to increase. This has led to a strong association between Algeria and
immigration in France proper, particularly in Paris, where many immigrants seek work. This
increase in diversity has in turn exacerbated deep-seated xenophobia focused on a
replacement of “French identity” due to an influx of “Arabs” and a clash between laïcité
(secularism) and visible religions such as Islam. In France, religion is legally restricted from
the public sphere -- a concept of freedom from religion which allows for citizens to worship
how they choose, but only in private settings. One has but to look as far as French headlines
over that past decade to get a sense of the multitude of identity debates surrounding the
Islamic headscarf, “burkinis,” and non-pork alternatives in French public schools. In recent
decades many have asked, is it possible to be Muslim and French? Is it possible to be African
and French? But in reality, these questions have been asked since the beginning of the French
colonization of Africa and have gone unanswered and avoided for over a century. Thus, the
aim of this project is to move towards the end of that evasion. Some of the most important
historical events that help us understand our societies today, are those which are omitted and
ignored rather than those held in the spotlight. There is often more to be said about the active
erasing of historical memory and what that indicates, than about mainstream historical
narratives. In France, historical memory permeates current events and social conflicts, and it
is important to understand from what time and national moment that memory springs. Most
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importantly France’s colonial history clashes with its republican tradition which laid its
foundation after the French Revolution of 1789.

Existing Literature
Starting in 1990s and early 2000s, French and Maghrebin scholars began approaching
the subject of colonialism in Algeria from a new perspective. While provocative histories of
the Algerian war were written very promptly after its conclusion, analyzing the topic saw a
lull in the 1970s and 80s as the French government attempted remedy the ruptures of the 60s.
However, it became clear that the area of study needed revisiting and that it was in danger of
passing out of public knowledge and schools. Scholars like Benjamen Stora, Pascal
Blanchard, Nicolas Blancel, Mohammed Harbi, Étienne Balibar, and Rachid Mokhtari began
drawing connections between colonialism and rising inequality in France. These scholars
have explored the concepts of identity, memory, historiography, and nationalism to better
understand issues of immigration and citizenship. Their work challenges narratives that once
sanitized France’s colonial influence in Algeria and demands that the country recognize its
undeniable legacy. Specifically, two new collections of articles and essays, The Colonial
Legacy in France: Fracture, Rupture, and Apartheid (2017) in addition to Colonial Culture
in France Since the Revolution (2013), have had enormous impacts on the way that the
current influence of French colonialism is perceived. However, while this body of knowledge
that seeks to tell the suppressed stories of French Algeria is successfully growing, it is still
relatively new and controversial. Consequently, many French government officials believe
that it should be kept out of the classroom, which contributes to a continuing disconnect
between the banlieue riots and terrorist attacks that are happening today in France and the
oppression and violence that once existed in Algeria. The goal of my thesis is to add to the
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rising tide of literature which seeks to spark a widespread movement and discussion about the
lingering impacts of colonialism in Algeria.

A Brief Overview of Analytical Structure
In chapter one of my analysis, the “Era of Subjugation,” I will explore and give
context to the history of French settlement and conquest in Algeria. I will focus on how the
French imposed a “civilizing mission” on the colony in addition to philosophies surrounding
the “modernity” of Africa. I investigated these projects through researching the many
methodologies used by the French government and army to weave “Frenchness” into the
everyday experiences of Algerians. Through the use of primary and secondary literature I
will illustrate the motivations behind the invention of the civilizing mission as well as the
economic pull factors that drew the French state to Algeria. Trade, labor exploitation, and
exotic tourism were also significant factors that influenced French domination. Chapter one
will be important for my third chapter which will demonstrate how a lot of these systems
have been recreated today in mainland France and are now affecting descendants of Algerian
immigrants and the resident North African population at large. Active neocolonialism,
stemming from the origins of the civilizing mission, is at the epicenter of France’s current
immigration crisis.
In chapter two I will dive into a time period of increasing conflict in Algeria which
followed the colonizing process. This will be specifically centered on issues of citizenship
and equality that arose as France named Algeria an extension of itself. I will touch upon both
World Wars and how they affected the growth of a nationalist Algerian movement that began
to call for independence. Chapter two will also give a history of the Algerian War itself,
especially in terms of the crimes committed by the French state in the colony in an attempt to
maintain order. It is crucial to analyze all these historical pieces in order to understand the
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development of the events and ideologies that shaped decolonization and the movement
towards a neocolonial French state.
In my third and final chapter, I will focus on the effect the Algerian War had on
France, both during the time period of decolonization and today. This background will be
important in examining the resulting historiography that was produced and disseminated both
in French schools and the media. I will then move on to analyze the terrorist attacks that have
taken place recently in France starting with the Charlie Hebdo shooting of 2015. I aim to
explain how these terrorist attacks have been misunderstood and misinterpreted by the public
through a lens of xenophobia and islamophobia which stems from the Algerian colonial
era. Rather than viewing these recent acts of terrorism as somehow naturally and unilaterally
associated with Muslim culture and faith, I instead frame these events as a consequence of a
deeply rooted resentment for three generations worth of cultural exclusion.
Finally, my conclusion will explore how the history of French colonialism has been
systemically forgotten and how it is only recently that this lack of commemoration is being
challenged by French historical discourse. This section will focus on projects that are
currently being put in place to aid the effort of speaking this history into existence to avoid
further colonial prejudice and amnesia. To begin however, it is necessary to be grounded in
the concept of “universal Republicanism” which plays a key role in how the French state
frames its national image.

The Paradox of Universalism as a Colonial Tool
Since the Age of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution of 1789, France has
brandished its historical ideologies of universal rights and republicanism with enthusiasm. In
particular, the philosophy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, has a
legacy unlike any radical proclamation in its history. However, I argue that the initial and
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fundamental concepts of French republicanism, have since been co-opted, manipulated, and
utilized to actually form a paradoxical system that departs from the document’s original
goals. French republicanism claims as its pillars universal equality, secular natural law, the
right and expectation of political participation of citizens, freedom of speech, and above all, a
belief in the absolute power of the voice du people.1 The canonization of these concepts was,
and still is, one of the most influential historical flashpoints in the Western world. Liberty,
equality, and fraternity became synonymous with French political and social thought,
developing into one of the most adamantly defended national identities in Europe. However,
these French values quickly became corrupted following the Revolution of 1789 through
their utilization to validate colonial imperialism, effectively rendering les droits de l’homme
inaccessible to specific French citizens or subjects. In an attempt to spread the enlightenment
of “civilization,” the French nation state drifted from its revolutionary roots grounded in
universal equality, to create what became known as the Second Empire. The resulting
colonial regimes presented oppressed native populations with “the image of ‘France the
colonizer’ which coexisted uneasily with ‘France of the Rights of Man.’”2 Where article one
of the declaration had affirmed, “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” many
Malagasy, Tunisians, Moroccans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Algerians found themselves
excluded from its narrative.3
In reality, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was, in all its irony,
used as a selective document that privileged only certain ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic
groups, and certainly did not welcome women into the world of universal participation.4 In
fact, as France began its “civilizing mission” in Northern Africa during the early 1800s, it

1

Van Kley, Dale K. The French Idea of Freedom: The Old Regime and the Declaration of the Rights of 1789
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994), 10.
2
Evams, Martin and John Phillips, Algeria Anger of the Dispossessed (Yale University Press, 2007), 27.
3
Van Kley, Dale K. The French Idea of Freedom, 10.
4
Prochasson, Christophe, Vincent Duclert, and Edward Berenson. The French Republic: Hsitory, Values,
Debates (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011), 104.
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was wielded as justification for the subjugation of “lesser peoples” who needed to be saved
by knowledgeable, modernized Frenchmen. The Second Empire was launched and framed as
a humanitarian mission that, underneath its guise, was a venture to bolster a sense of French
glory. The resulting relationships with North African countries fostered by the French
metropole, would eventually transform into tense revolutionary movements modeled after the
promises of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. In particular, Algeria
would prove to be a perplexing problem with regard to the civilizing mission and France’s
ideologies of assimilation. Of all of France’s North African colonies it was Algeria that
would become so irreversibly entangled in French identity during its 132 years under the
Republic (the longest of all territories in the Maghreb), that even today the relationship can
only be described through pages of analysis. Its early history of colonization is the bedrock of
modern day tensions surrounding the question, who is “French” and who is not? While the
French sentiment that expansion into Africa was a moral good during the 1800 and 1900s
was a product of its time (widely shared across Europe), I argue that even with hindsight, the
nation still refuses to acknowledge colonialism’s implications. Ever since the French state
actively worked to create Algeria in its image, forcing the new colony to shed its own cultural
and historical narrative, it has attempted to distance itself from all culpability in terms of
colonial crimes against humanity. Instead it has endeavored to aggressively isolate itself into
an exclusive cultural club from a people on whom it once forced its “rational civilization.” To
understand how this progression transformed from an imperialist project to acute xenophobia
and rejection, one must first look as far back as the invasion of Algiers.
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Chapter 1: An Era of Subjugation: Conquering Algeria
Colonial Structure in the Early 1800s
In the early 1800s, France had fallen down the rung of European colonial powers. It
had lost much of its North American territories, its influence in Egypt, and with the advent of
the “scramble for Africa,” felt immense pressure to reassert itself as a dominating imperial
force. In 1830, the opportunity for a display of power arose in the wake of a surging
Napoleonic romanticism.5 Following an argument between the ruler of the Ottoman regency
in Algiers and the French consul, France claimed justification to invade and blockade the city
of Algiers. On May 10, 1830, a royal proclamation was made to the French soldiers who
would depart for the invasion of Algiers as a reminder that the Algerian people had long
suffered the oppression of the Turkish regime and would welcome them as liberators.6 To
further prepare the crew of military men, most of whom had never previously set foot in
Northern Africa, the Minister of War provided pamphlets and directives to guide them. It
included key phrases in Arabic and Turkish, as well as a section on health that was written
with the help of veterans who had served in the invasion of Egypt.7 The French soldiers were
told 200,000 Arabs with a formidable cavalry would be awaiting them and to recall the
bravery of their predecessors who had taken part in the Crusades. Many soldiers saw their
objective as the mission of a Christian nation to overcome “a belligerent Islamic people.”8
Some were convinced of the prized economic benefits that would surely become attainable in
Algeria, but many were indoctrinated with the notion of an inevitable outcome – the
enhancement of French glory.9 The French navy swiftly took over the coastal towns of

5

Sessions, Jennifer E., By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2011), 128-129.
6
Lorcin, Patricia M.E., Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria (New York:
I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), 18-19.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
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Algeria and implanted a military presence in the country that would stay there for more than
a century.10 The widespread plundering and random murder that followed, began a long
lasting pattern of exploitation and dehumanization of Algerian inhabitants at the hands of the
French. What had begun as a military move aimed at saving a dying empire and boosting the
grandeur of a nation, quickly became an economic and social project that would lead to an
extremely complex colonial relationship between France and Algeria.
By 1831 France had conquered Algiers and began occupying the rest of the nation.11
Just like the lucrative maritime colonies in the Caribbean, Algeria was first considered a
promising territory for great trade wealth. Although French forces faced staunch Muslim
resistance and war during the first years of their presence, the French government decided
Algeria would also be a perfect location for French settlement. The decision was made in the
wake of worldwide abolitionist movements which had begun to demonize former systems of
colonization. The new system was focused on peuplement et fertilisation, or “peopling and
fertilization.”12 It was framed as an agricultural and expansionist plan that would not exploit
native populations, but instead replace them with enlightened French citizens. This
substitution took the form both of transporting French citizens to Algerian soil, but also the
extermination of the parts of the local population which did not except French rule. It can be
said that, “settler colonialism seeks to replace the natives on their land rather than extract
surplus value by mixing their labor with a colony’s natural resources . . . Thus, the primary
object of settler colonialism can be characterized as one of elimination.”13 The French never
came to replace the Algerians, but rather supplanted themselves in all possible positions of
power. The French government, army, and colonial settlers would eventually come to

Evans, Martin, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 8.
Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001), 3.
12
Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 182-183.
13
Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 180.
10
11
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successfully take over Algerian education, agricultural, religious, and political systems to
support their needs.
When the French arrived in Algeria they discovered many differences between their
own culture and those of North Africans -- differences they felt justified the implementation
of systems of subjugation. Particularly, “in Algeria the French found Islam, against which
France had long defined itself.”14 France characterized itself (and continues to do so) as a
strongly Catholic, Gallic country at the time of Algerian colonization. Islam had been an
enemy of the state for centuries, dating back to the Crusades, and to the French represented
something archaic, backwards, and dangerous to European society. But, “the question was
not, how can one modernize that which is antithetical to modernity?” In fact, the question the
French asked was, “what mechanisms, strategies, and implements, can be used to defeat
Islam and make civilization triumph.”15 One of those strategies was implemented in 1841
when Thomas Bugeaud became the governor of French territories in Algeria.16 He was tasked
with putting down the resistance of Abd al-Qadir, the Islamic scholar who led the final
collective struggle against French colonization in Algeria. The conflict between French
military forces and local groups revolting against invasion, raged throughout the 1840s and
led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands on both sides. This was due the fact that Bugeaud
instituted a total war policy through which he intended to terrorize the Algerian people into
submission.17 Molded into a Christopher Colombus-type figure, defined as a great explorer
and pioneer, French history textbooks now “extol Bugeaud as the founding father of French
Algeria” who overcame great odds for the benefit of his nation.18 “For Algerians, though, his

14

Hannoum, Abdelmajid, Violent Modernity: France in Algeria (Massachussetts, Harvard University Press,
2010), 8.
15
Ibid.
16
Hannoum, Violent Modernity, 19.
17
Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 162.
18
Evans and Phillips, Algeria Anger of the Dispossessed, 29.
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name lives as a byword for brutality,” and he remembered as one of the great engineers of
genocide in Algeria.19
Thomas Bugeaud was born in 1784, the seventh child of a wealthy, land owning
family on the rise. While his older brothers became honored members of the army and
military, Bugeaud’s father told him he was destined for the clergy – a destiny that would
never materialize.20 His path was quickly thrown off course by the national eruption of
revolution and the consequences of the Terror which took the heads of many aristocrats. Due
to his family’s wealth, Bugeaud’s parents were arrested and slated for execution by the
guillotine. Nevertheless, much to their son’s relief, they were saved by the downfall of
Robespierre and were acquitted. The family used their new-found freedom to move to the
French countryside, and as a result, Thomas Bugeaud spent much of his childhood in an
agricultural environment where he cultivated a love of growing things.21 By the age of 20
however, he made the decision to volunteer for Napoleon’s Imperial Guard, where he would
begin his long and tumultuous military career. By 1808 his duties plunged him into
Napoleons’ Peninsular Campaign in Spain, which would inform his experiences and
decisions later during his station in Algeria. Spain proved to be very hard for the French to
control, rife with constant resistance and guerilla warfare. There, Bugeaud took part in savage
repression offensives and learned how to “fight in the streets.”22 Through his dedication for
the next six years, Bugeaud would consistently move up through the ranks and was named
Colonel by King Louis XVIII after the fall of Napoleon.23 However by 1818, Bugeaud was
tired of the revolutionary instability of his country and its military campaigns and returned

19

Evans and Phillips, Algeria Anger of the Dispossessed, 29.
Singer, Barnett and John Langdon, Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire
(Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 50-56.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
20
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home to France to his agricultural projects and to get married. But his hiatus from military
life would not last long.24
In the early 1830s, the life of Thomas Bugeaud took many momentous turns. Bugeaud
won the favor of King Louis Phillippe, the monarch who coordinated the invasion of Algiers.
Louis Phillippes placed him in the Algerian town of Oran with a garrison on troops following
the army’s initial military offensive.25 Bugeaud’s first project was submitting resistance
forces in Oran to the French sword saying, “In war, it’s war with all its consequences; one
cannot make a demi-guerre.”26 Throughout his career, Bugeaud would continuously defend
brutal tactics used in Algeria by giving accounts of the barbarous methods of his Arab
enemies, who he said often cut off the heads of French prisoners.27 The terroristic tactics he
employed were termed razzia (or raids) which involved scorched-earth methodologies such
as raiding villages, public decapitations, and widespread sexual violence towards native
women.28 The relentless clashing between resistance forces organized by Abd al-Qadir and
French military personnel, as well as the targeting of civilians, had staggering consequences - “By the mid-1850s, war and economic disruption had reduced the Algerian population to
almost half its precolonial size, from about 4 million to 2.3 million.”29 As a result, Bugeaud
was able to effectively crush all organized Algerian resistance by force, but had used the aid
of a very instrumental intelligence agency.

The Construction of a Police State
Upon conquering Algeria, the French immediately established a government
administration which was designed to oversee local affairs which became known as “les

24

Singer and Langdon, Cultured Force, 50-56.
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Singer and Langdon, Cultured Force, 72.
28
Sessions, By Sword and Plow,163.
29
Sessions, By Sword and Plow, 162.
25
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bureaux arabes” or the “Arab Offices”. The organization was designed to collect
demographic information, create a knowledge base of cultural customs and public morality,
to understand local and general law, and to study tribal factions. But the bureau’s most
important role was its goal to create a large archive that would contain local histories and
assets, allowing it to keep all the information gathered in one collection.30 This was thought
to be the best methodology through which to infiltrate native society and consolidate French
influence. Most of the officers and members that made up the organization had graduated
from mostly military academies and were suddenly transformed into makeshift
anthropologists and sociologists. Their work effectively framed an entire nation as stuck in a
more barbaric time. Many of these men considered themselves to be “arabophile” and saw as
their goal the improvement of colonial society.31 This took the form of modernizing projects
or tangible advancements made “through the construction of houses and public utilities, such
as fountains, wells, public baths and markets.”32 However the reports describing how such
“enhancements” of Algerian society were received by locals, or more commonly rejected, are
riddled with judgements passed by the officers. As a result, regardless of its humanitarian
mission, the documents of les bureaux arabes form an assortment of statistical and human
records, accompanied by repeated paternalistic condemnations. This system not only allowed
for the French to understand how to use indigenous cultural information against Algerians
themselves, but it also allowed the state to inventory resources that could be useful to it. An
entire section of the archive was dedicated to detailing the property of locals including
names, houses, animals, access to water, and local markets.33 This made it easier for French
officials to find methodologies to dispossess locals of their property. Local political and

30

Hannoum, Violent Modernity, 21.
Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 80.
32
Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 79.
33
Abi-Mershed, Osama W., Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010) 83.
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revolutionary knowledge was also stored in les bureaux arabes that eventually became the
most destructive to native populations.
These documents contain local knowledge. Colonial interest in what the population
thought of the French, the motives for the revolt, and the intensions of the insurgents - and their whereabouts, tactics, and alliances.34
These damaging sources were provided both by Algerians who were loyal to the French and
also by religious and tribal leaders of the groups that opposed them in exchange for empty
promises. The infiltrative efficiency of les bureaux arabes convinced General Bugeaud that
its expansion into a military institution was potentially critical to his plan of dominance and
Algerian submission.35
While the officers of les bureaux arabes were not originally considered active
members of the army, under Bugeaud’s leadership they worked as its executive, domestic
force. Each bureau worked within a geographical area known as a cercle, within which the
system would oversee the policing and pacification of the local population.36 Depending on
the size of the city or region of the particular cercle, an army officer was assigned a team of
bureau representatives who saw to almost all aspects of the administration of Islamic tribes.
This included surveillance, the writing of regular reports, and even the overseeing of judicial
proceedings.37As a result, the collection of information that the officers collected was utilized
against Algerian insurgents, specifically in the razzias that followed Bugeaud’s rise to power,
even insofar as actively turning local factions against each other in an attempt to confuse
cooperation.38 Perhaps the most infamous genocidal event under Bugeaud’s leadership was
the enfumade of the Ouled Riah tribe. In order to hide from French military forces, 500

34

Hannoum, Violent Modernity, 95, 105.
Ibid.
36
Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 79.
37
Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 79.
38
Hannoum, Violent Modernity, 95, 105.
35
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defenseless Algerian men and women took shelter in nearby caves. Upon discovery, the
French army smoked the hiding “rebels” to death with the goal of forcing them out to be
shot.39 The violence became so extreme that the French government sent a commission to
Algeria to investigate the brutalities committed by Bugeaud’s strategy of “total war” in 1846,
bringing the widespread violence to an end.40 One member of the investigative commission
stated, “We have surpassed in barbarism the barbarians we came to civilize,” in response to
the terror and destruction he found in Algerian villages.41 Following the release of the reports
catalogued by this group of emissaries, there was an outcry against the invasion of Algeria
among factions of French politicians. Many felt military forces should be pulled out of
Algeria entirely and that certain members of command should be legally persecuted for
ordering and permitting razzias. However, among those who condoned the violence
perpetrated in Algeria, and even among those voices who condemned it, there was also a
strong, common opinion that, “in the eyes of the world, such an abandonment would be a
clear indication of our decline.”42 As a result, withdrawal was eliminated as a course of
action. The chosen route would be expansion and the civilizing of Algeria, which was
expected to be beneficial to the population which had already been terrorized by the army for
a decade. The following transition from war to colonization took time as French officials
constructed their plan for maintaining and furthering dominance in the region.
By the 1840s, pro-replacement colonialists, who had hoped to completely expel the
Algerian people and to create an empty country ripe for the creation of a new European
civilization, were forced to abandon their hopes. During the initial period of war following
the invasion of Algiers, the cost of human life was heavier than expected. The French army
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had sacrificed more than 35,000 of its men and 340 million francs for the Algerian cause.43 In
addition, their political rivals who either rejected the colonial project all together, or who
hoped to civilize native Algerians rather than kill them, condemned the loss of life among the
indigenous population. They believed settler colonialism (with the declarations of the recent
Revolution in mind) should and could be a more moral imperial project aimed at
assimilation.44 It was believed that Algeria could be the model for the “modern” colony, free
from the smear of slavery and the “torment” of humanity. Thus, a focus on creating a settler
society in Algeria, where new markets would provide tropical goods, new military
strongholds in the Mediterranean, and new lives for France’s surplus population, took hold in
French politics.45 In the 1830s, France was facing an overpopulation crisis. Large cities were
hit hardest as “the nation’s population had increased by almost 20 percent between 1801 and
1831.”46 Cities like Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles suffered epidemics of crime, disease, and
homelessness as their populations skyrocketed. Algeria appeared to be the perfect solution to
the dilemma and a possibility to create a new agricultural economy within a reasonable
distance from the metropole. Army expeditions spoke of large expanses of uncultivated and
incredibly fertile lands that would be suitable to French families. Thus, the project of French
settlement in Algeria began with the hopes of convincing hundreds of thousands of citizens to
emigrate.

Les Colons: Building the Pied-Noir Identity
Algeria quickly became the Wild West of French culture following the initial invasion
of Algiers. Many of the French citizens who emigrated there between the 1840s and 1880s
left mainland France with the hopes of striking it rich quickly and were spurred on by a sense
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of adventure.47 The promise of land, which the French army had reported was fertile and
unoccupied, appeared to be an incredible opportunity to many poor working-class members
of French society. One colonial advocate said that the prospect of an exodus of impoverished
French families was in fact,
A great step towards the extinction of mendacity, even of pauperism, and thus would
contribute a great deal to the security of the social order. Afterwards, there would be
almost no more vagabonds or any of those lazy and penniless men always ready to
sell their services to those seeking to disturb public tranquility.48
Thus, the French government hoped to dump its destitute, suffering poor on Algeria and for
the relocation of entire families to lead to the creation of a new agricultural powerhouse
across the Mediterranean. To their disappointment, many unattached French men went to
Algeria to become land speculators and entrepreneurs instead. As a result, in its early years
Algerian colonial culture was extremely masculine. The colonists, also known as colons or
Pieds-Noirs (Black Feet), began to build many cafes, inns, taverns, and wine shops.
Unsurprisingly, “drinking establishments quickly became the most numerous European-run
business in Algeria”.49 By 1837, alcohol was the largest colonial import and soon “those of
the Algerian countryside were associated with drunken debauchery, sexual disorder, and
crime,” in the metropole.50 In addition, the preponderance of alcohol starkly contrasted the
traditions of the local population, which often forbade its consumption under Islamic statutes.
Overall, the imbalance of gender among the new colonists, the majority of which were men,
led to stories of the indigenous sexual conquests. Thus, the myth of the “sexual looseness” of
native women and the mystery of the Algerian Kasbah proliferated through the accounts of
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French orientalist writers who exoticized and eroticized the colony.51 For those colonists who
did not chose an entrepreneurial route however, land speculation was the easiest avenue
through which to make money and amass influence. Made easy by land acquisition statutes
set forth by the army and the lack of knowledge of the French language among natives, many
Frenchmen were able to swindle Algerians out of their land.52 In the confusion following
invasion, Pieds-Noirs were able to strike unfair deals with the unwitting indigenous
population who then became dependent upon their employment. Thus, not long after their
arrival, a discernable hierarchy between French colonists and the local population formed,
sowing the seeds for future conflict.

The Civilizing Mission is Implemented
Two years following the reports written by the investigative committee sent by Paris
to investigate General Bugeaud’s tactics, the Second Republic officially extended
departmental status to its territories in Algeria.53 As part as the government’s plan moving
forward, and in an effort to shift focus from the atrocities of invasion, “humanitarian”
projects were proposed. This plan became known as la mission civilisatrice, or the civilizing
mission. This design included the domination and “improvement” of all local realms,
including academic, religious, economic, and political spheres. The mission functioned at its
strongest in Algerian schools by wielding the power of indoctrination. Catholicism and
French values were imparted in classrooms and taught to Algeria’s youngest citizens. In fact,
the natives that were funneled into the new education system were referred to by the word
évolué, meaning evolved, showing how French-educated Algerian students were viewed in
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comparison to their almost “prehistoric” counterparts.54 In addition to the education system,
the French also aimed to dominate religious morality and practices in Algeria and attempted
to degrade the cohesion of the local Islamic community. Islamic teachings, beliefs, and
traditions were weeded out and discouraged. While not all of the population of Algeria was
Muslim, the vast majority lived lives in which the traditional values of the Koran played a
major role. Most of the domains the French wished to conquer were in some way influenced
by Islam posing a formidable obstacle to France’s supposedly secular principles. Lastly,
political and economic disenfranchisement were also important components of la mission
civilisatrice. French political systems and the introduction of capitalist economic practices
that defied Islamic doctrine were considered vital to the success and betterment of the
Algerian people. Regardless of its positive pitch, each element of this plan would effectively
contribute to the exaltation of the French way of life at the expense and disparagement of
Algerian existence.

Teaching “Frenchness”: Colonial Education
The design of a French education in Algeria was built upon a foundation of ideologies
proposed by an influential, post-revolutionary era philosopher. In the late 1700s and early
1800s, the intellectual Henri de Saint-Simon, published a number of works that would later
define French education in Africa and also influence the role of les bureaux arabes. SaintSimon’s theories envisioned a plan to rejuvenate society after the atrocities of the French
Revolution of 1789 with a goal of implementing many Enlightenment era ideas.55 In his work
entitled Lettres d’un habitant de Genève à ses contemporains, he explained that he believed
his project could successfully “replace the divisive social hierarchies of France with a more
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legitimate and conciliatory order.”56 This “order” would, instead of distinguishing individuals
based on their class or family heritage as during the Ancien regime, valorize individual
industry. This included all scientific, moral, public, and academic works, thus defining the
intellectual elite of the era as the new masters of society. In addition, while Saint-Simon saw
industry and science as the new salvation for French society, he also believed in a universal
Christian faith that would guide his conceptualized world. 57 Naturally, such a system, he
proposed, would enhance the lower classes and proletariat of France through their association
with elite intellectuals. This ideology could also be applied to the betterment of what he
believed to be lesser races, who, Saint-Simon claimed, became improved by their exposure to
European thought. While his theories were not widely acknowledged right after they were
published, they were put into motion through the civilizing mission of Algeria. One of his
apprentices, Prosper Enfantin, arrived in Algeria in 1839 and went on to implement SaintSimon’s doctrines, greatly influencing the framework of colonial education.58 Through that
structure the French hoped to facilitate “intellectual and rational progress focused two main
objectives” -- first that the acquisition of the French language was paramount and must be
forced upon students, and secondly that the Arabic curriculum be completely expunged.59 As
Auguste-Alexis Lepescheux, inspector general for public instruction, said in 1832, “The
Arabs, Moors and Jews will not become civilized but by the use of the French language; they
will not be useful to us, and will not be sincerely gained to our cause until our idiom has
become familiar to them.”60 Education was a means to the ends of the subjugation and
compliance which the French required of its colonial subjects, robbing Algerians of Arabic
teachings. As French officials attempted “to seize the youth in its infancy,” Algerians lost the
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valorization of their native tongue and were made foreigners in their own country.61 Learning
about Algerian culture and history was cycled out as if it had never been, in order to create a
new generation of subjects loyal to France.
Twenty years later, the educational system became more complex and organized. On
July 14, 1850 a concrete and restrictive blueprint for both primary and higher education was
codified by a Presidential decree to be expedited by the Minister of War. It stated that in
French Muslim schools for boys, the French language, elements of arithmetic, and the system
of legal weights and measures were the sole necessary subjects. As for the girls, the
curriculum was even more confining with all the same trappings as the male model, except
for legal education which was aptly replaced by needlework.62 The decree was also split into
chapters, the third of which outlined Surveillance and Inspection. All schools were by law
inspected “by a civil servant or a French Officer” who was “assisted by an indigenous civil
servant”, likely to make locals feel more at ease.63 These monitors reported their findings to
the Prefect of the city which was appointed by the French government who then passed the
educational information up the ranks to the Minister of War. The French-Algerian education
system thus became a military operation that transformed institutions of learning into policed
spaces, managed by army officials for decades. But perhaps the most pointed colonial
decision made to influence academics was the targeting of a particular demographic of
student which became most important to architects of the French colonial education system.
Specifically, the children of the elite wealthy members of Algerian society were provided
access to superior French education in attempt to win them over to the cause of colonization.
Some were even sent to prestigious schools in the metropole to become further “refined” by
reason.
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One purpose of concentrating upon the elites of the colonial territories was, of course,
to assure that the natural leaders of the colonies would feel sentimentally tied to
metropolitan France and as a result prove to be politically loyal to France. 64
In this way the French guaranteed not only long-term influence in the colonies through
tailored teachings, but also created a group of Algerians who supported their own servitude,
thereby undermining their countrymen who opposed French occupation. Many of the
descendants of these wealthy youth would go on to form the population of Algerians who
opposed independence from France during the country’s revolution, which would erupt a
century later.

An Old Rivalry: French Catholicism vs Algerian Islam
However, the lessons taught by la mission civilisatrice in Algeria came in different
forms and were not simply targeted at children. The French also embarked on a religious
rebuilding in which they set standards and used demonstrations of power to remove Islam
from daily life. Since the beginning of its colonial undertakings, France had always
approached the conquering of foreign populations through the paternalism of Christianity.
Not only was Catholicism the most dominant religion in the country, but it was also virtually
synonymous with France itself. In a journal titled Missions Catholiques which documented
the Christian “salvation” projects that were implanted in the French colony of Madagascar,
Ferdinand Brunetiere aptly concluded that French missionaries do not differentiate between
the words “French” and “Catholic.”65 The work of the missionaries was to free “imprisoned”
and “oppressed” peoples from their superstitions and false religions, in turn converting “the
indigène to the genius of our race.” The identity of French imperialism grounded itself in
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Catholicism and the belief that when paired with powerful republican ideas, that it could
salvage infantile African populations from the depths of their ignorance. As in Madagascar,
the religious mission waged by the French would not differentiate that which made Algeria
Catholic from that which also made it French. As a result, Muslim families were told their
children would be placed in schools where they would learn the moral superiority of
Catholicism and that their spiritual landmarks would be taken from them. There were
“frequent requisitions of mosques, shrines, and cemeteries -- and their subsequent demolition
or conversion into French establishments” that the citizens of Algiers were hopeless to
prevent.66 In this way Algerians were shown that to be French was not to be Muslim and that
they did not have full rights with regards to freedom of religion. In addition, any native
Algerian suspected of following the Koran as his or her moral or legal compass in place of
the secular, French Civil Code could lose their status as “French national.”67 However this
secular code was designed mostly to protect Catholic institutions the government did not
want disturbed.
Certain Muslim practices informed how and why the French demonized Islam.
Polygamy became a crime punishable by incarceration in the colony as it was considered a
direct threat to the sacrament of marriage the Catholic Church guarded beyond all things. On
the issue of Muslim practices of marriage Charles Richard, an officer of the Arab Bureau,
stated:
Here is what the Arab people are: almost three million souls who live in the confusion
of all the imaginable abominations, an orgy of all known immoralities, from the one
of Sodom to the one of Mandarins. A man plunders and robs his neighbor. The latter
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pays him back. He marries for women and runs after others. When he is strong, he
eats the weak. When he is weak, he stabs in the back.68
This concept of morality versus immortality is the dialectic through which the French church
sought to clearly define Islam and Christianity, “Arab” and “French, as opposites. As another
officer of the Arab bureau, Colonel Eugène Daumas, once put it, “Take a Frenchmen and an
Arab and put them in a pot and let them boil on high together. After 24 hours, you will still
recognize the Christian from the Muslim.”69 Under the religious differentiation imposed by
the French colonial regime, a demarcation of nationality was also drawn. Thus an association
between Catholicism and French citizenship was made between locals. As a result, in an
attempt to gain access to many of the rights European settlers enjoyed, many Algerians did
convert to Christianity, or at the very least presented as adherents to the Catholic faith. Yet to
their disappointment, they still did not automatically earn citizenship. Even by 1903 these
individuals were still referred to by the Court of Algiers as “Christian Muslim natives”
because “Muslim” was considered a title which Algerian natives could not shed by simply
adopting Christ.70 Many believed, as Colonel Daumas articulated, that when “boiled down”
an Algerian was always a Muslim. Unfortunately, the French state would also use religion as
a way to economically disenfranchise the native population of Algeria.

Economic Inequity in French Algeria
The dismantling of Muslim society did not end with the push of Catholicism or the
criminalization of Islamic culture. Algerian Muslims became very vulnerable to economic
ruin under the yolk of their colonial masters, and as a result suffered for basic necessities.
Many were stripped of their farm lands for the use and profit of French settlers who began to
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arrive in larger and larger numbers between the 1840s and 80s.71 Upon arrival the French
believed that Algerians were inherently lazy due to how they farmed the land, which the mère
patrie termed inefficient. This was partially due to the fact that traditional Muslim society
functioned through a tribal system of the communal sharing of lands. To more “effectively”
use the land, the French instituted the 1844 Land Law which dictated that, “uncultivated land
within specified areas was classified as vacant unless valid title deeds were provided to prove
ownership.”72 Due to the lack of deeds as a result of religious and cultural practices, French
officials easily seized local land. In order to further justify their hijacking of acreage, the
French framed themselves as the productive saviors of wasted natural resources. Where
agricultural lands were once used to provide food for Algeria’s native populations, the French
decided to use them for “more lucrative” and “useful ventures,” such as producing wine
which they could then trade with the metropole.73 This changing of hands had its
consequences.
Poverty rapidly grew among the native Muslim population of Algeria and famine
became widespread as they were denied their “traditional forms of support, such as the
setting aside of food for times of hardship.”74 In 1867 alone, nearly three hundred thousand
Algerian Muslims died from starvation, which new Pied-Noir landowners quickly blamed on
the army.75 This made many of the inhabitants more reliant on low-paying menial positions
provided to them by French settlers, conversely increasing the production of European
agriculture. This effectively created a master-slave relationship in the colony regardless of an
absence of legal bondage. Islam, in addition to the French caricature of the Arab, became
synonymous with pauperism, crime, and violence. Crime rates grew as starving, desperate
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Muslims resorted to theft, assault, and revolt to survive. In fact, “in 1868 the 600 colons of
Medea were robbed on average four times each; annual losses through theft rose to a half a
million francs.”76 Naturally, settler populations reacted strongly, turning on Muslim
“vagabonds” in the press creating a yellow journalism so fanatical that Muslims were even
accused of cannibalism.77 Thus as a result of the crippling of religious tribal traditions and
practices both with regards to spiritual principles and community structure, the Algerian
Muslim was reduced to the stereotypes he had been given. The prejudice of French civilizing
mission effectively created a terrible cycle of self-validation.

Political Domination of the Colonist Population
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which had defined the values of
the French Republic did not exist in its original form Algeria. For colonial populations it was
selectively edited. Indigènes, or indigenous populations, occupied a precarious grey area
between full citizens of the French Republic and second-class colonial subjects. In fact
Algerian natives were left deliberately in “legal limbo for nearly two decades” following
invasion as the French government grappled with its own internal contradictions as
champions of universalism and as imperialist masters.78 Finally in 1865 it was decided that
while the annexation of Algeria gave inhabitants the status of “French nationals”, that
indigenous populations were in fact not French citizens, legally allowing the state to refuse
the benefits of civil and political rights.79 In addition, the electoral and legal systems in
Algeria were propped up by discriminatory practices which gave an illusion of local
participation, but in reality ensured the political dominance of pro-colonialist ideologies. Due
to the fact that the majority of the population did not have the right to vote (as Muslims were
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barred from participation), most local departmental councils were composed of almost
entirely of male French settlers. In some years, as much as four-fifths of many legislative
bodies in Algeria were French settlers, with a small Muslim contingent that was hand-picked
by state officials who made their selection based on loyalty and socioeconomic class.80 This
made it essentially impossible to make any sort of legal reform to benefit local populations or
Muslim tribes under the French regime. Unfortunately, as the population of French settlers
continued to grow throughout the late 1800s, more and more unreasonable legal restrictions
were placed on natives.
The infamous Code de l’indigénat, or the “Native Code” was established in 1881 and
wouldn’t be repealed until fifty years later as a result of Algerian nationalist demands.81 The
code made it legal for the state deal out penalties and fines to its greatest political threat with
ease – the tightknit Muslim community.
The indigénat reached into every cranny of the Muslim majority’s life. Under its
twenty-seven provisions Muslims were controlled by legislation right down to
requiring permission to go on pilgrimage. They could be imprisoned for making rude
remakes about French authority.82
The statutes were designed to achieve full submission among the Muslim community of
Algeria and to politically disarm them. The code declares that to hold public meetings, open
schools, or own a weapon, the population needed permits and approval from the French
government. The Native Code also mandated that upon refusing to provide transportation,
food, water, or fuel to colonial administrators, locals could be punished.83 The code worked
so well in consolidating the political power and dominance of the resident European
population, that France actually used it as a model for other colonies under its rule. Similar
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systems were put in place in Senegal, Cambodia, and Madagascar.84 Among locals, the
Native Code fostered strong resentment and a loathing of colonial hierarchy. But it also left
many questioning how their identity was categorized. If Algeria was French, did that make
Algerians French? And if not, how were they defined under the authority of the French
Empire?

La crise d’identité : “The Muslim Question ”
Through its project to establish a new France in Algeria while also defining itself
against what was Algerian, the French state effectively created a widespread identity crisis
among its subjects and colonial citizens. As a result of being forced to integrate French
culture into their daily lives and social existence while also being simultaneously framed by
the French stereotype of the “Arab,” native Algerians found themselves occupying a noman’s land of existence. As Mouloud Feraoun wrote in the early 1900s in Le Journal,
When I say that I am French, I give myself a label that all Frenchmen refuse to give
me. I express myself in French, I was educated in French schools. I know as much as
the average Frenchman. But who am I, for heaven’s sake? Is it possible that, as long
as labels exist, I don’t have one? Which is mine? Tell me who I am!85
The projected perspective of the colonizer was that the Algerian people were not a mix of
France and Algeria, but instead were neither. This isolation that allowed for the easy othering
the native population, further justified segregation and hierarchy imposed by the settler
presence in Algeria. As understood through Feraoun’s words, many Algerian citizens did not
believe that their identities had been given to them or created by the French, but rather
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withheld.86 Following colonization, the children of Algerian families were referred to as la
deuxième génération, or “the second generation”, as if the Algerian people hadn’t existed
before the arrival of the French.87 Many members of this second generation and the
subsequent youth of the late 1800s and early 1900s, would instead of understanding
themselves as outside of an erased Algerian history or an invasive French present, identify as
both. Thus, the crisis of la question indigène was born into Algerian literature and French
discourse. The question probed whether it was at all possible to be both Muslim and French,
both indigenous and French, and both non-European and French.
With the advent of World War I and the massive casualties produced by newly
mechanized warfare, the man power of all Francophone territories was called upon to fight on
the fronts and in the trenches. About 170,000 Algerian men fought for French forces in The
Great War, making up part of L’armée d’Afrique which also included men from Morocco and
Tunisia. 88 These soldiers became the poster children for French colonial propaganda,
representing the most loyal and dedicated of indigènes. Many joined the ranks because they
expected to receive full recognition as French citizens, finally bringing the question of their
identity to an end. Others joined simply out of destitution and the need for wages and food.89
However by 1914 when the war began, groups who staunchly opposed the supporting of
French colonial structures in all their forms began to organize as well. Specifically,
traditional Muslim factions encouraged against Algerian participation in the French army
with the belief that the indigenous population should not die for changes that may never come
and for a state that vilified Muslim culture.90 Unfortunately, these organizations proved
correct as Algerian rights saw little change at the war’s end, even for veterans. However, in
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1919 there was a call for the automatic naturalization of Algerian veterans both within the
colony and in some political circles in the metropole – there was even talk about extending
full citizenship to all Algerian men. But the proposals were shut down by the majority in the
French government out of a fear of being “engulfed, drowned in the mass . . . submerged in a
new race.”91 As a result, the Algerian man could not even fully claim the identity of “French”
veteran as it was also kept out of his reach. In response, discontent grew in the colony among
native groups who began to form new cultural and political groups motivated to work
towards increased autonomy and legal reform. The French government, in an effort to
appease this concerning rise in indigenous organization instated a new law in 1919 to make
achieving citizenship more attainable for Algerian men with Koranic civil status as a
concession.92 However, this was not enough to stay the progression of what would become
the foundation of a nationalist Algerian movement.

The Early Civilizing Mission in Conclusion
Under the guise of a humanitarian project, the goal of the civilizing mission was to
negate Algerian existence as it had been understood before the arrival of the French. Through
invalidating Algerian cultural and social practices in terms of economics, religion, and
education, the French were able to best consolidate power in their new territory. In addition,
through the civilizing mission, the French were able to give labels and stereotypes to the local
population, making it possible to frame the system as charitable, working in favor of the less
fortunate masses of Africa. By illustrating Algeria’s “backwardness” and its potential to
resemble an “enlightened” European country, the French government was able to justify its
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own self-serving agendas as beneficial. As Frantz Fanon wrote, the philanthropic presentation
of the civilizing mission is both necessary and successful because,
The colonist is not content with stating that the colonized world has lost its values or
worse never possessed any. The “native” is declared impervious to ethics,
representing not only the absence of values but also the negation of values.93
The “native” is thus in need of correction in his Islamic fanaticism and feebleminded in his
knowledge of French capitalism according to his European master. He is ignorant in his lack
of knowledge of the French language and moral customs. In addition, Fanon seeks to point
out that regardless of the proclaimed project of the civilizing mission to make the native
“better,” the native is also simultaneously framed as fixed, immoveable in his shortcomings.
This renders the perpetual presence of the colonizer essential in all spheres of colonial life.
To show the world the benefits of the “good works” designed to right the wrongs of Algeria,
France organized a celebratory event on the centennial anniversary of the invasion of Algiers.
The 1931 Colonial Exposition of Paris was coordinated not only to glorify the civilizing
mission at the apex of the Second Empire, but also to unify the French nation at a time when
some began to question the mission’s good intentions.
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Chapter 2: The World Wars and the Revolution for Independence
The State of Colonial Affairs and the Colonial Exposition of 1931
During the interwar period of the 1920s and 30s, colonial consciousness both in
Algeria and in hexagonal France began to change. In light of the global changes brought
forward by the Russian communist revolution of 1917, radical political parties seeking to
destroy all forms of social hierarchy gained popularity across Europe. Meanwhile, across the
Mediterranean Algerian reform groups who sought more autonomy from European rule
began to assemble, like the Young Algerians and the Association of Algerian Ulema.94 In
France newly invigorated communist and socialist coalitions clashed with lasting
imperialism, which sought to continue to uphold the Republic’s reputation as a powerful
empire. The interwar period thus became a crossroads of conflicting ideologies and an era of
flux that left the colonial situation of Northern Africa all the more complex. By far the best
illustration of an attempt to unify the French public under a shared identity during this time
period is the Colonial Exposition of 1931, staged on the outskirts of Paris. This spectacle,
created to display the prowess of the French Empire, was advertised with slogans like, Visit
Greater France and Around the World in One Day.95 The exposition boasted exhibits,
recreations, native peoples, and demonstrations that allowed visitors to experience the
“family jewels” of the French civilizing mission. For example, perhaps some of the most
impressive parts of the park that families and travelers could visit were recreations of Angkor
Vat in the Cambodian sector or Casablanca in the Moroccan corner.96 Peoples from each
French colony were invited to inhabit their country’s sector of the park and to perform
cultural rituals, daily chores, or social activities in front of European spectators. This aspect
of performance was sold as a humanitarian project, meant to dispel any “frightening
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reputations as wild and barbaric individuals,” that local Parisians might harbor against their
colonial brethren.97 In fact, the institutions of the civilizing mission were even represented to
display the benefits of French intervention in other regions of the world. Churches, schools,
and hospitals were built within the park as well to exhibit the modernizing effect of
colonialism. However, the exposition’s true effects were to exoticize, commodify, and to
make attractions of indigenous culture. In making a human zoo, a living ethnic museum, the
colonial exposition crystallized the perception of colonial peoples as stuck in the past. From
after it opened in May of 1931 until it was closed, the colonial theme park saw nearly 35
million visitors and made an unexpectedly large amount of money.98
However, the Colonial Exposition of 1931 was not without its critics or controversy.
It was condemned by many colonial immigrants living in Paris and also by political groups
who saw colonialism as a stain on France’s reputation. In fact, a contre exposition was
created by a group of surrealists, communists, and socialists just outside the grounds of the
attraction.99 The group sought to expose the darker side of French colonialism to encourage
people to refuse to visit the exposition using a number of different tactics. In addition to the
use of large banners denouncing the park, the groups also displayed graphic proof of the
reality of colonial war. They held up images and illustrations of the violence perpetrated by
the French army in their campaigns to conquer various countries, in addition to the destitution
and poverty faced by many who actually lived in the colonies.100 The contre exposition had
some success in disgusting Parisians and visitors from around the world enough to discourage
them from visiting the sanitized version of the civilizing mission. One Surrealist and poet,
Louis Aragon, published a work titled Persécuté persécuteur (Persecuted Persecutor), to
point out the internal contradictions of the Colonial Exposition.
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Sun, sun from beyond the seas you render angelic
The excremental beard of the governors
Sun of corals and ebony
Sun of numbered slaves
Sun of nakedness sun of opium of flagellation
Sun of fireworks in honor of the taking of the Bastille
Above Cayenne a fourteenth of July
It rains it pours on the Colonial Exposition.101
His words perfectly encompass the blatant hypocrisy of the celebration of French colonialism
by contrasting it with the celebration of the French Revolution. Aragon poignantly points out
that while Parisians, ignorant in their bliss, happily visited the colonial exposition, that les
indigènes suffered in the colonies. During the interwar period, the glaring contradiction of a
universalist, Republican nation bent on colonial domination, became more and more difficult
to swallow, both within the metropole and abroad.

The Birth of a National Consciousness
While the interwar period in mainland France was characterized by imperial pride, it
was also defined by the growth of nationalist reform and resistance groups in Algeria.
Quickly after the end of World War I and the failure of the French government to extend
more rights to Algerians, pro-Islam, pro-autonomy organizations gained popularity. Starting
in 1912 with the establishment of the moderate Jeunes Algériens (Young Algerians), these
groups would become progressively more radical and demanding leading up to World War II,
serving as the foundation for the revolution that would take place at its end. Specifically, the
Young Algerians first mobilized organization in response to the conscription law of 1912
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which demanded mandatory service in the French Army for Algerian men102. Led by the
grandson of the late Abd el-Qadir, Emir Khaled, this group of young and highly educated
men wrote the first of many Algerian manifestos that would proliferate throughout the
interwar period. Hailing mostly from bourgeois or middle-class families, the Young
Algerians in their early stages believed in the principles of French Universal Republicanism
and did not question the metropole’s sovereignty. They did however demand the end of the
Le Code de l’Indigénat, equal taxation, suffrage to be extended to a larger portion of Algerian
society, and lastly, representation in the National Assembly.103 None of their demands were
met by the French Government until 1919 when a law designed to make citizenship more
available to Algerian men was passed. Unsurprisingly, this concession felt far short from
addressing all of the goals of the Young Algerians, and by 1926 they expanded by creating
the Féderation des Élus Indigènes, which brought together Algerian elected officials and
professionals dedicated to reform.104 One member however would go on to further radicalize
the beliefs of the Young Algerians and transform it into the first to imagine a fully
independent Algerian nation.
In 1926, Messali Hadj, a member of the Young Algerians who lived in France, created
the Étoile Nord-Africaine (The North African Star).105 Hadj had served during World War I
in the French army, been educated in a French school, and had emigrated to France to work
after his service. During his time with the Young Algerians, Hadj believed that even with the
continued control of the French in Algeria, that the idolized universal Republicanism of 1789
could be recreated in his home country. By 1926, following his experiences at war, working
in the metropole, and after witnessing the effects of the Great Depression on immigrant and
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indigenous populations, he began doubting that dream.106 Under Hadj’s leadership the North
African Star demanded freedom of press and association, a parliament chosen through
universal suffrage, the confiscation of large estates from French colonists, the establishment
of Arabic schools, and above all, it radically called for Algerian independence.107 His
organization became the first to conceptualize a unified Algerian nation, autonomous from
France. As a result, Hadj would be arrested by the French Vichy government fifteen years
later during World War II for suspected communist activity. But the damage was done.
Hadj’s popular ideologies started a chain reaction, spurring the nationalist Algerian
movement to diversify and promoted the rise of new popular leaders. In 1931, a staunchly
Muslim coalition of Islamic scholars started the Association of Algerian Ulema. Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Sheikh Abelhamid Ben Badis believed that
Arabic and Islam should be reinstated as the center of Algerian culture and be the uniting
force of the people.108 These men were dedicated to recovering their Muslim history which
had been erased and ignored by French colonizers. Ben Badis became one of the most
revered Muslim figures of the Algerian nationalist movement and created institutes with the
goal of training Islamic educators. After his death in the early 1940’s, he became a mythical
national hero whose teachings would be later used in the Algerian Revolution.109 The
legacies of men like Hadj and Ben Badis became powerful sources of inspiration for many
Algerians during their revolution for independence. However, in response to strong antiFrench sentimentality they had unearthed, right-wing, fascist groups began to form among
French settlers in Algeria.

Right-Wing Reactionist Politics of the Pieds-Noirs
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The intensification of Algerian nationalist philosophies created widespread tension
and anxiety among French Pieds-Noirs across the country. In addition, Algeria was hit very
hard by the crash of the Great Depression and suffered economically during the 1930s. Even
though the local Muslim population was hit hardest due to unequal wage and employment
status, the settler population began blaming non-white groups for the monetary hardship felt
nationwide.110 Specifically local Arab and Jewish populations were scapegoated and pitted
against each other by advocates of imperialism who wanted to distract the masses from the
economic culpability of colonialism.111 Urbanization among native Algerians rose as the poor
moved to increasingly crowded cities to find work, pushing them into close quarters with
French colonists. Meanwhile in mainland France, a right-wing, extremely conservative
Catholic group, mostly comprised of World War I veterans, le Croix de feu (or the Flaming
Cross) was gaining popularity. The organization’s influence came to Algeria in 1928 as
World War I Pied-Noir veterans began to coordinate.112 While the Algerian branch of the
organization was small at first, leading local Remembrance Day celebrations, hosting film
screenings, holding meetings, and organizing parades for veterans, it began to mushroom in
size by 1932.113 Le Croix de Feu eventually became well known among the settler population
as not just a veteran’s coalition, but as an anti-left, anti-republic group that rejected the
separation of Algeria and France. The association began to hold demonstrations and
disseminate their newspaper, Le Flambeau, using both to lambast the French government
which members felt wasn’t doing enough to defend settlers against rising local unrest.114 In
1934 le Croix de Feu had become so large in many Algerian cities that different locations
began creating subgroups called cadres, each of which had its own leaders. Not unlike the
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Hitler youth, the group also created subgroups for women and children which were focused
on community activities like sports and charity events.115 Then in 1935, a distinct leader of le
Croix de Feu had been found in Colonel de la Rocque, a World War I veteran. During that
year, he led a demonstration in Algiers of nearly 10,000 supporters, surprising nationalist
groups who doubled their efforts to organize an anti-colonial organization that would
encompass all factions.116 Not long after however, this upward surge of political
organizations and ideologies was interrupted by the global plunge into World War II and the
horrors of its aftermath.

World War II and the Descent into Decolonization
The course of World War II and the catastrophe it bore, markedly impacted France’s
empire and its image on the world stage. The downfall of France at the hands of Hitler’s
army and the rise of the Vichy government, left a legacy of humiliation and disappointment
that would affect Northern Africa for decades after the end of the war. While the war itself
postponed the fledging independence movements beginning to materialize in Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia in the 1930s, the post-war global climate proved to be ripe for the
downfall of French colonialism. However, the war for autonomy in Algeria wouldn’t
officially begin until 1954 and was preceded by many catalyzing events with regards to both
liberation and revolt. The emancipation of the Maghreb from Vichy power by American and
British military forces greatly impacted prevailing ideologies of Algerian liberation and
marshalled in widespread insurrection. The resulting revolts and massacres that occurred in
Sétif and around the country in 1945 galvanized and informed an organized national
movement to completely cut ties with French influence. However, Algeria was not the only
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country that sought its independence from imperial domination. In other parts of the world,
previously French and British-held colonies began to prove that the independence of “the
third world” was possible, creating a world-wide indigenous movement. Further adding to
this complex decade of flux, the United States and Russia rose as the new world super powers
following World War II, leading to the competitions of the Cold War, spreading anxiety
among capitalist powers who were losing footholds in colonial territories. Thus, the post-war
era can be described as a crossroads which swept Algeria up and carried it towards
revolution.

The Allied Powers and Operation Torch
Under the Vichy regime, Algeria became a strict anti-republican, authoritarian police
state.117 Submitted to the rule of Marshall Petain, political prisoners and unwanted ethnic
groups were persecuted, communist parties were outlawed, and the resources of daily life
became more scarce.118 However, the Vichy regime was popular among Pieds-Noirs who felt
that under its directives, they were safer from Algerian nationalist groups.119 With regards to
the native population, the downfall of France had an entirely different effect. As witnesses to
the humiliation of France and its capitulation to the Nazi’s, nationalist groups felt
emboldened. The French Empire no longer appeared impervious to foreign powers -- an
impression which only became further solidified by the region’s subsequent liberation from
the Vichy government. In 1942, Allied Forces launched Operation Torch to free Northern
Africa from the grips of the French puppet government. Working together, British, Canadian,
and American forces landed in Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, quickly sweeping aside Nazi-
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sympathetic French forces.120 Specifically the presence and influence of the American
soldiers would prove to have a significant and lasting impact. To the chagrin of both the
colonialist nations of England and France, President Roosevelt ordered that leaflets be
dropped in both Morocco and Algeria saying, “We come to your country to free you from the
grip of conquerors who seek to deprive you of your sovereign rights, your religious freedom
and the right to lead your way of life in peace.”121 In addition, the Americans brought with
them the ideas of the new Atlantic Charter which outlined their country’s anticolonial policy
and admonished the dangers of territorial expansion.122 However President Roosevelt was not
alone in these sentiments. In the wake of World War II, colonialism and nation building
became associated with Nazism and fascism, pressuring Allied countries still holding
territories to grant widespread independence. It was suddenly impossible “to confidently
view ‘true colonization’ in a positive light.”123

The Frustration of the Maghreb
Near its end and after World War II, calls for decolonization skyrocketed. However
due to pressure to compete with the new world super powers of the United States and the
Soviet Union, made decolonization very unfavorable for the French government.124 In
addition the fear of a loss of imperial identity, insidious racism, and economic setback kept
the National Assembly from fully considering the independence of Algeria. As a result
France clung to its territories and was condemned by members of the United Nations. Many
world leaders felt it had become obvious that, “the conditions that had made France’s
extensive colonial empire possible had changed and the stage was set for its disintegration.”
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It was no longer feasible to deny the fact that, “the heart of this disintegration lay a challenge
to the very basis of France as the supposed origin and repository of universal value.”125
During their time in service, many Algerians who had fought for the French during World
War II felt the same. Unfortunately however, many of these veterans would come home only
to realize that despite a growing global disapproval of French colonialism, it would not be
abandoned. Free France regarded the empire a part of the country’s patrimony just as the
Vichy government had – a hypocrisy that would render Franco-Algerian assimilation
impossible.126 In protest, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco all began petitioning General
Charles de Gaulle to discuss terms for increased autonomy and independence from the
French government between 1943 and 1945.127 In 1942, nationalist groups under the
leadership of a new rising leader, Ferhat Abbas, wrote The Manifesto of the Algerian People
calling for self-government in Algeria.128 But these requests were mostly ignored as the
French government instead attempted to appease indigenous populations. On March 7, 1944
the Provisional French government implemented a new ordinance stating that public law
governed all French territory and granted full political rights to about 65,000 Algerian
men.129 Many however, refused to recognize this gesture, as it failed to reach the demands of
Abbas and his followers. To put further pressure on the French state, they formed Les Amis
du Manifeste de la Liberté which sought to unite all insurgent groups in favor of
independence under the helm of one organization.130 In this environment of discontent and
frustration, tensions between colonists and nationalists grew to a violent degree.

Sétif and its Aftermath
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May 8 is a date recognized as a time for celebration in France. However in Algeria on
May 8, 1945 is remembered as the moment when Franco-Algerian relations fell into total
disrepair. In the countryside town of Sétif, anti-colonialist demonstrators clashed with local
colonists in a bloody confrontation that provoked and stirred the early stages of the Algerian
Revolution. Tensions in Sétif between locals and the Pied-Noir population had become
severe by the spring of 1945. Due to a lack of rain, and the dominance of land-owning
colonists, indigenous groups were suffering from lack of food and work.131 However, the
foreign-owned Compagnie Genevoise in the area was prospering on its 15,000 hectares of
land.132 To show their discontent, native Algerians who believed in the nationalist programs
of groups like Les Amis du Manifeste de la Liberté decided to organize a demonstration on
May 8 in the center of town. The date was significant as it was the celebration of Victory in
Europe and the end of World War II. Anticipating possible protests, French police forces in
Sétif banned all banners and flags representing independence. But nonetheless, nationalists
arrived in the morning of May 8, 8,000 strong to lay a wreath at the war memorial at the
center of town brandishing the Algerian star and crescent. Not only did they disregard the
instructions of the police concerning their freedom of expression, but the demonstrators also
arrived with knives, axes, and sabers.133 At first the protest was peaceful, but when police
officers attempted to forcibly take flags, agitation erupted. Twenty-year-old Bouziz Salah
was the first to be shot by French forces, launching both sides into violence.
The accumulated casualty reports made a grisly reading: 103 Europeans murdered,
plus another hundred wounded; a number of women brutally raped, including one
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aged eighty-four. Many of the corpses are appallingly mutilated: women with their
breasts slashed off, men with their sexual organs stuffed into their mouths.134
The successive backlash from the local Pied-Noir population and the French army was swift
and extreme. The number of Muslim dead has been debated since the massacre of Sétif and
fluctuates between reports. The Tuber Report officially produced by the French government
places the number between 1,020 and 1,300 Algerians were murdered in response to violence
against Europeans. However, the Egyptian press reported as many as 45,000 dead – a number
that was later accepted by the Algerian government following independence.135
The shocking uprising and violence in Sétif spread like wildfire throughout the
Algerian countryside. De Gaulle’s reaction from the metropole was swift and severe, sending
10,000 troops into Algeria to put down the revolts.136 French soldiers set out to make
examples to discourage the rest of the native population from resisting the imperial
dominance of the state. They burned homes, bombed villages, and organized summary
executions. Entire villages were forced to humiliate themselves by prostrating in front of the
French flag, while some soldiers even made trophies from the men they killed. The backlash
lasted until May 24, and yet the French did not declare war on Algeria.137 To do so would be
to recognize Algeria as its own nation, as separate from the metropole. Colonists also took
part in the retaliation, lynching and mutilating natives.138 Thousands were buried in mass
graves, and subsequently the French government attempted to bury the crimes along with
victims. However, the international press condemned the atrocity and the excessive response
of the French military. All claims that deaths exceeded 1,500 were consistently denied by the
French government.139 Many nationalists who had been waiting for the right moment for the
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beginning of a revolution called for widespread mobilization after Sétif. However due to the
overwhelming efficiency and brutality of the French response, a general uprising became
impossible. Nationalist leaders were arrested, and the diversity of independence groups made
organizing a nationwide effort difficult.140 Regardless, the long-term effects of the massacre
at Sétif and the damage it did to the project of French colonialism, were devastating -perhaps the most destructive of them being the creation of newly radicalized figures,
especially among indigenous writers hailing from French colonies around the world.

Anti-Colonial Literature
One of those writers was Kateb Yacine, an Algerian who participated in the protests at
Sétif at the age of sixteen.141 Later in adulthood, Yacine would recall, “The shock which I felt
at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never
forgotten. From that moment my nationalism took definite form.”142 The event shaped his
writing, mostly in his poetic and theatrical works written from the Algerian perspective. The
literature he produced often outlined the relationship between the colonizer and the
colonized, criticizing the French presence in Algeria and demonstrating the effect it had on
Algerian identity. In 1956 Yacine published Nedjma, meaning star in Arabic, which became
his most famous work. The collection, which includes poetry, historical narrative, personal
diaries, and dramatized sequences, completely changed global perception of Maghrebi
literature.143 Yacine’s style has been described as “a terroristic technique that breaks the
proper structure of the novel,” and also as artistically incoherent.144 Experts on his work
theorize this choice of style was used to contrast politics and poetry as antagonistic to each
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other, and to also mimic the disillusionment and dislocation of the Algerian identity under
French occupation. Yacine particularly alludes to the confusion of Algerian heritage and
native history in Nedjma.
The fathers killed in the rides of Abd el-Kader (the only shadow that could cover the
expanse of land, man of pen and sword, only leader capable of unifying the tribes to
rise to the state of nation, if only the French had not come to break his effort . . . but
the conquest was a necessary evil . . . and just as the Turks, the Romans and the
Arabs, the French could but only take root.145
Here Yacine not only hints at a lost generation of “fathers” killed in the war of conquest
against French forces, but also to Abd el-Kader, the mythical hero of the Algerian resistance.
He insinuates that had yet another colonizer not interrupted the unification achieved by
Kader, perhaps Algeria would have become a consolidated nation. A staunch nationalist,
Yacine makes frequent references in his writing to an idyllic independent and undivided
Algeria. Scholars also believe it was not only Yacine’s experience at Sétif that influenced
Nedjma, but also his arrest by the French police and his mother’s descent into madness.146
After witnessing the horrors of the massacre at Sétif, Yacine’s mother was institutionalized
due to her permanent traumatization. His work, along with many others in the 1940s and 50s,
created an entirely new genre of Algerian nationalist literature that was systematically
censored by the French government. However, writers far from Algeria in other regions of
the French empire would also come to influence and support its independence through their
literature.
One of the most influential writers on French colonialism during the mid-1900s was
Aimé Césaire, a Martiniquais intellectual. He is often credited with founding the Negritude
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movement in Francophone literature and is well known for his criticism of French
colonialism both in his poems and treatises.147 In 1955, right after the beginning of the
Algerian War, he published his Discourse on Colonialism which explored the racial and
cultural hierarchies imposed upon the French Caribbean. In the piece, Césaire also frequently
criticizes the civilizing mission and attempts to debunk it as a humanitarian project.
They talk to me about progress, about ‘projects completed’, about illnesses cured,
about standards of living raised above their own. I talk about societies emptied of
their being . . . of lands confiscated, of religions massacred, of artistic splendors
demolished, of extraordinary possibilities wiped out.148
Here, not unlike Yacine, Césaire laments the loss, destruction, and cultural stunting of
indigenous peoples which he believed accompanied French colonialism. In favor of the
autonomy of all French invaded territories, Césaire rejected any project for assimilation.149
Thus, in collaboration with writers from Senegal and other French departments, Césaire
advocated for a pan-African movement by creating intellectual journals like the African
Presence in 1947.150 With regards to the Algerian independence movement, Césaire was
most influential for his theories on fascism. Césaire regularly compared colonialism to
Nazism, both in his writing and in interviews – a poignant contrast that bolstered
international support for the French decolonization of the Maghreb and Indochina. In one
statement, he explained that what made Hitler so abhorrent to western white society was that
the dictator had for the first time, “applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then
had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of
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Africa.”151 By pointing out the paradoxical nature of a country which had fought against the
genocide and fascism systemically imposed by Hitler, but also supported colonialism, Césaire
held France accountable for its internal contradictions. In fact, his anti-colonial theories were
influential enough to provoke the radicalization of a future ally to the FLN, or the
revolutionary party of Algeria: Frantz Fanon.
Frantz Fanon also grew up in the French dominated island of Martinique. From a
young age, he was encouraged by his family to not speak his native language, but to adopt
French instead. In his teens, Fanon attended a high school where he was taught by Aimé
Césaire who introduced him to notions of an independent “Third World”.152 After high
school, Fanon studied medicine, focusing on psychology and attended university in France.
During the Second World War, he fought on the side of Free French Forces to combat the
fascism of the Nazi Vichy government.153 However, after the war Fanon became more and
more disillusioned with France as he witnessed the psychological effects of the racial and
cultural hierarchies of colonialism in his own patients. Fanon theorized that colonialism
created a master-slave dialectic that forced the “native” to internalize the concept of his own
inferiority to colonial authorities.154 In addition, Fanon believed that French colonialism was
doomed to collapse around the world as indigenous populations conceptualized their own
nationhood and autonomy, free from fascist oppression. In the Algerian War he found a
model for his theories on how this would come to pass:
The colonized man liberates himself in and through violence. This praxis enlightens
the militant because it shows him the means and the end . . . The violence of the
colonial regime and the counterviolence of the colonized balance each other and
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respond to each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity . . . Violence among
the colonized will spread in proportion to the violence exerted by the colonial
regime.155
Unable to reconcile living in France and working for the state medical system while in the
meantime colonized peoples fought oppression, Fanon left his profession and France to
dedicate himself to the Algerian struggle. In the late 1950s he joined the ranks of the FLN, or
the National Liberation Front of Algeria. He wrote for their newspaper, El Moujahid,
preaching that pan-Africanism was the key to the liberation of colonized peoples.156 In 1961,
Fanon published one of his most famous works, The Wretched of the Earth, which became a
revolutionary manifesto, describing the tactics necessary for the success of the FLN and the
Algerian people. His theories were, and still are, very controversial in their outright support
of extreme violence. Fanon believed that because the French colonies were created through
violence, that colonized peoples could only dismantle the oppressive structures that kept them
from self-constitution through violence.157 The Wretched of the Earth condemns political
movements that seek compromise or avoid confrontation with the colonial master – Fanon
theorized that Algerians needed to wage total war against the French to take their
independence.158 To ask for permission to be separate from the French state would legitimize
the domination of the colonizer and the subjugation of the Algerian people. The belief of the
impossibility of decolonization through concession and the necessity of violence outlined in
Fanon’s theories, would come to define the Algerian War.
Each of these writers greatly impacted intellectual thought in France proper. Each
wrote using the French, the language of the colonizer, in order to reach a European audience
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and change prevailing thought on the positive aspects of colonialism. Many French historians
and philosophers began to reconsider whether the Republic could truly adhere to its
traditional values while also supporting imperialist programs. In fact, philosopher Jean-Paul
Satre wrote a preface to accompany Fanon’s publication of The Wretched of the Earth to
analyze such a contradiction. Sartre explains that upon picking up Fanon’s book, Europeans
put themselves on trial:
Have the courage to read it, primarily because it will make you feel ashamed, and
shame, as Marx said, is a revolutionary feeling. All is lost unless . . . I, a European,
am stealing my enemy’s book and turning it into a way of healing Europe. Make the
most of it.159
The literature produced by figures like Yacine, Césaire, Fanon encouraged portions of French
society to take and introspective look into the aspirations of their country, both at home and
abroad. Thus the anti-colonial movement which had begun in the colonies arrived in the heart
of the metropole and created allies for the Algerian independence movement. By the end of
the 1940’s this sentiment became widespread in France as it began its first phase of forced
decolonization following war in Indochina.

The Fall of Indochine and the Rise of the FLN
Just as Fanon had predicted, France’s colonial world did begin to change violently
and crumble in the late 1950s. 1954 specifically not only marked a large military loss for the
country, but also the birth of new rival revolutionary groups. In French Indochina, a war
between the Vietnamese and French colonial forces had been raging since the end of World
War II. But in 1954, rebel Viet Minh soldiers shocked the world and defeated the French
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army, proving that colonial independence was possible.160 The victory of Ho Chi Minh
catalyzed a world-wide system of solidarity between oppressed peoples living under
“Western imperial powers.” In addition, the defeat was yet another humiliation for France
which had hoped to achieve redemption by restoring order to Indochina after its losses in
World War II. This failure was compounded by the establishment of a new organization,
spurred on by the example of Indochina which would become the face of Algerian anticolonialism. The FLN, or the National Liberation Front, united in October 1954 to organize a
unified Algerian struggle for independence. Led by nine men, including Mostefa Ben
Boulaïd, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Rabah Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Krim
Blekacem, Hocine Aïd Ahmed, Mohamed Khider, and the widely popular Ahmed Ben Bella,
a new manifesto, flag, and national identity was created.161 To the French, the rise of the FLN
was the greatest threat that had yet been posed against French Algeria, and it had come in the
midst of widespread colonial crisis.
On All Saint’s Day, November 1, 1954 the FLN made a proclamation outlining its
demands for Algerian independence. The manifesto defined the coalition’s goal as the
“restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social within the framework of
the principles of Islam,” in addition the “preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without
distinction of race or religion.”162 Although the FLN wanted to reinstate Islam as a large
cultural focal point in Algeria and used the Islamic symbol of the crescent on its flag, the
FLN publically stated that its aim was not to wage a holy war. In addition, the FLN defined
itself as a socialist organization, although it would be widely framed as communist by the
French government.163 In response to the proclamation, the French political body remained
quiet, refusing to acknowledge the existence of a separate Algerian state. Paradoxically
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however, the French government did enter into negotiations with other Maghrebin countries,
Tunisia and Morocco, to discuss their independence from French rule. When asked why
Algeria was not to be given the same consideration, the French government claimed that due
to the fact that Tunisia and Morocco were “protectorates,” they warranted more autonomy.
Algeria, however, was different. As President Pierre Mendes-France put it,
One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation,
the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the
French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably
French . . . Between them and metropolitan France there can been no conceivable
secession.164
This concept that something made Algeria more French than other French colonies would
serve as the metropole’s reasoning for refusing independence for the next decade. However,
the FLN had anticipated this response and military backlash as a result of their demands –
nationalist organizations had attempted to negotiate with France on diplomatic and legislative
terms for years without success. As a result, quickly after November 1 , the FLN began
preparing for a widespread military offensive. Ben Bella was put in charge of amassing arms
both left over from World War II and also provided by Tunisian, Moroccan, and Egyptian
sympathizers.165 The stage was set for the FLN’s first move to attack the structures of French
colonialism in Algeria.

The War Begins
During November and December of 1954, the FLN began launching a series of
attacks in the major metropolitan centers of Algeria. Their initial targets were mostly
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governmental buildings and police stations, French colonists, and Algerian civilians in favor
of colonial domination.166 However by 1955, violence between Algerian forces, the French
army, and colonist populations skyrocketed. The FLN’s first large-scale attack occurred in
Philippeville, where FLN fellagha, or soldiers of the revolution, killed 37 Pieds-Noirs.167 In
reprisal, colonist and vigilante groups organized what they termed ratonnades, or “rat hunts”,
killing 1,000 to 5,000 Muslims.168 The event set off a wave of uprisings in the Algerian
countryside, creating a climate of fear that pushed colonists into cities to escape attack.
Throughout 1955, the FLN would come to kill 1,000 colonists along with 6,000 Muslims
which they saw as sympathizers.169 The French response was extreme – the government sent
20,000 troops in to bring insurgents to heel.170 The government also appointed Jacques
Soustelle Governor General of Algeria, who gave all French soldiers and military commands
license to make any decisions in the field that were deemed necessary to battle the FLN. In
this way Soustelle was able to avoid all culpability for the questionable decisions of the men
who served under him because he never had to give direct orders calling for brutality.171
Violence rose in large part due to the fact that the FLN utilized guerrilla warfare tactics and
chose unassuming individuals dressed as normal civilians to carry out suicide bombings, it
became more and more difficult for the French army to distinguish FLN soldiers from the
normal population.172 Thus it became common for the French army to murder innocent men,
women, and children in their search for Algerian nationalists. Brutality on both sides shocked
the world. On the part of the FLN, new members were expected to kill a “traitor,” whether a
French soldier or colonist sympathizer, to leave the apprenticeship stage.173 An environment
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of extreme violence was fostered in the early stages of the war – the French army assumed
the guilt of all Arabs until proven innocent, and the FLN accepted terrorism as a necessary
evil.
The war could only escalate into 1956 and 57; there was no turning back. The French
army began guillotining Algerian prisoners and soldiers, while the FLN bombed cafes and
restaurants frequented by Pieds-Noirs.174 On the international stage, the French struggled to
gain the support of its allies who felt they could not back an imperial war. Specifically,
Franco-American relations became very tense as the French government asked for public
support, money, and military aid from Washington. When the United States refused, a
frustrated Ambassador Maurice Couve de Murville told the French State Department, “the
less said by the Americans on North Africa, the better.”175 Every country that expressed its
support for the FLN’s project or refused to show support for the colonial stubbornness of the
French, increased the popularity of the Algerian independence movement. As a result, by
1956 the number of FLN regulars had increased from just a few thousand to between 15,000
and 20,000.176 That year, Abbane Ramdane took over leadership of the FLN, imposing strict
hierarchies on the organization and calling for increased violence until France recognized
Algerian independence and the Pied-Noir population of Algeria evacuated.177 The FLN
called upon “the local population to take up axes, knives, and clubs,” to attack European
civilians, Muslim collaborators, and French military personnel. One French soldier would
later recall,
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There were so many bodies they had to be buried with bulldozers. The mayor
personally directed lynchings. In one case, city officials corralled all the young
Muslim men they could find into the local stadium and killed them man to man.178
In response to the escalating crisis, the Pied-Noir population began to feel more and more
disenchanted with the metropole. Regardless of the strong display of power shown by the
French army whom they considered their heroes, the Pied-Noir population did not feel that
the French government was doing enough to protect them from FLN attacks. In 1956 in
Algiers, 20,000 colonists and anciens combattants, or World War veterans, organized a
procession to protest the inaction of the French government.179 Among colonists, army
officials, and French politicians, it appeared that more had to be done to stop the spread of the
National Liberation Front. The French army organized to try to destroy the FLN in Algiers,
the largest city in the country.

The Battle of Algiers
By 1957, the FLN had expanded its tactics for fighting the French presence in
Algeria. The organization called for a nationwide strike to put a halt to the colonial economy
that was benefitting the metropole. Nearly 82% of the native working population (mostly
employed in the service industry) complied in Algiers, increasing tensions with the resident
Pied-Noir population.180 To respond to the collective action and to reassure pied-noir
citizens, General Jacques Massu was sent into Algiers with a 4,600-strong paratrooper
legion.181 Massu was an experienced veteran, well known for his brutality. One general, Paul
Aussaresses, who worked under Massu in Algiers, described him saying,
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He was a great soldier and knowing it he took many liberties . . . In Indochina he
recaptured Hanoi in 1946 with such energy that Emperor Bao Dai requested his
transfer back to France. Massu had mopped up the city using mortar fire and taking no
prisoners.182
Massu’s experience in the French colonial war in Vietnam and the humiliation of its loss,
would inform the uncompromising tactics he used in Algiers. Upon arrival, Massu quickly
imposed martial law and strict curfews. Soldiers were told to shoot anyone they saw out after
dark.183 Massu also gave orders to break the general strike called by the FLN and to organize
a thorough sweep of the Casbah (the Muslim neighborhood of Algiers) in the attempt to flush
out terrorists. Copying tactics used by Napoleon’s army in foreign territories, French military
personnel began identifying all the inhabitants of the city and numbering their homes for
surveillance.184 Any Algerian who participated in the strike or who was suspected as an FLN
sympathizer was questioned and arrested by the French army.185 To break the local strike, the
French army used armored cars to tear down closed store fronts, forcing owners to sell their
goods or fall victim to looting.186 In response, the FLN continued a constant barrage of
bombings and guerilla warfare.
The Battle of Algiers lasted for almost an entire year. The casualties and
consequences of the battle would come to shift the entire course of the Algerian
independence movement. Until its end, the FLN increased bombings of restaurants, cafes,
concerts, homes, and other locations frequented by Pied-Noir civilians. In one case a
cafeteria was bombed, killing five and leaving sixty wounded. As a result, French forces
meticulously combed the Casbah, searching everyone for bombs – especially women wearing
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Muslim robes and veils. The FLN frequently used young girls as suicide bombers because
they did not incur as much suspicion.187 Hundreds of Muslims were shot and lynched in the
wake of each bombing and summary executions were carried out by the French army daily.
As General Paul Aussaresses explained in his account of the battle, there was an understood
system in which French military personnel covered for one another’s illegal actions. He even
admits that many summary executions in the Battle of Algiers were framed as failed escape
attempts even if they weren’t.188 Shootings of Algerian citizens were justified by the leaders
of French forces through the assertion that if put in custody, the terrorists would escape, and
that if they were set free, they would continue to perpetuate violence.189 Extensive records of
all those who were arrested and questioned by the French army were organized to avoid war
crime accusations. Prisoners who were murdered in captivity were documented as “LL”, or
“liberated” to make it less obvious that they had been purposefully disposed of.190 The
extensive violence led to widespread international outcry against the conduct of the French
army. However, perhaps the biggest impact of the Battle of Algiers on international opinion
was its exposure of the systemic use of torture by French forces.

Institutionalized Torture and the Reinstatement of de Gaulle
With thousands being arrested in Algiers and other hotbeds of colonial violence,
rumors that the French army had begun using methods banned by the United Nations
proliferated. Under Article 303 of the French Penal Code, practicing torture had been made
illegal during the revolution of the late 1700’s. In fact, it imposed the death penalty upon
anyone who utilized it.191 With regards to the war in Algeria, the French government
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denounced and denied all forms of torture, but the high numbers of citizens disappearing into
the night in Algiers spoke to the contrary.192 By 1958 French forces had declared victory in
the city of Algiers, but the means by which they had achieved the feat became public, and
discredited the reassurances of the French government. That year, Henri Alleg, an anti-war
writer for a French communist newspaper, published his book La Question. It was an account
of his experience of being tortured by French paratroopers for a month in Algiers and became
a sensation in mainland France.193 His testimony made it clear that under the leadership of
men like General Massu, torture was used often and kept secret from the press. Alleg
describes being humiliated, taunted, stripped naked, and brutalized by French soldiers.194 He
also reported on other frequently used techniques that he suffered in addition to the many
Algerian men and women who came through the detainment center he was held in. Alleg was
electrocuted (including on his genitals), endured water torture, was drugged, and refused food
and water.195 In his own words,
A flash of lightening exploded next to my ear and I felt my heart racing in my breast. I
struggled, screaming, and stiffened myself until the straps cut into my flesh . . . Each
blow stupefied me a little more, but at the same time confirmed me in my decision not
to give way to these brutes who flattered themselves like they were the gestapo.196
The French soldiers tried tirelessly to intimidate Alleg for his anti-war sentiments and to pull
any possibly valuable information out of him. They even threatened his family back home in
France.197 Alleg said that he felt it was his duty to publish the work so that the French people
knew what was being “done in THEIR name” in Algeria.198 The book became an

192

Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 197.
Henri Alleg, The Question (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1958), 34.
194
Alleg, The Question, 46.
195
Alleg, The Question, 44-47.
196
Ibid.
197
Alleg, The Question, 58.
198
Alleg, The Question, 96.
193

Brown 62
international scandal, selling 65,000 copies in its first five weeks, and sparked anti-war
protests in hexagonal France.199
As a result, French politicians and military officials endeavored to organize damage
control. They attempted to ban and censor La Question by taking “special legislative
powers,” but the effort failed and backfired.200 Alleg had opened a flood gate of information
that further villainized the French military project in Algeria. Accounts of Algerian men who
had their stomachs pumped so full of water they almost drowned, Muslim women raped and
violated with objects like bottles, and secret mass graves made their way into the
international press.201 It was becoming clear that there was a sadistic and perverted system of
“forcing information” out of suspected Algerian rebels that had not only been condoned by
the French army but sanctioned by high command. In the wake of World War II, many
agreed with Alleg in comparing General Massu’s men to the German gestapo that had
terrorized millions in Europe. When questioned about the methods used by paratroopers, a
certain Colonel Mathieu replied,
OK, fine, let’s try to be precise then. The word “torture” doesn’t appear in our
orders . . . The FLN, for its part, asks each of its members to keep silent for twentyfour hours after capture . . . The organization therefore has the time necessary to
render information useless. And us, what kind of questioning should we adopt? Court
procedures that can drag on for months?202
Mathieu’s response is characteristic of the many justifications for torture that were given by
French representatives – torture was defined as a necessary evil in Algeria to beat the FLN.
The ends justified the means. Due to the fact that bombings had become essentially an
everyday occurrence, military officials explained that they were all but powerless without the
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usage of “strong-arm” techniques.203 Their claims were backed by the supportive Pied-Noir
population of Algiers who saw hardliner French paratroopers as their heroes and only chance
against FLN terrorism. But the damage of Alleg’s book had been done, and anti-fascist
organizations coordinated for protest in the metropole.
In the midst of scandal and new international support for Algerian revolutionary
forces, General Massu called upon the French government to reinstate the man who had
successfully brought France through World War II – General Charles de Gaulle.204 Massu
believed that if anyone could hold the state together and achieve military victory at the same
time, it was de Gaulle. Thus, on June 1, 1958, with the support of the National Assembly,
General de Gaulle became Prime Minister and was granted “extraordinary powers” for the
following six months. Three days later, he gave a famous speech in Algiers to a large
European crowd in which he said, “Je vous ai compris,” or “I have understood you.”205 It
appeared to Pieds-Noirs that de Gaulle would be their savior, and to many in France that he
would not soon give up the colonial project in Algeria. Meanwhile, many of France’s top
intellectuals had been vocal about the Algerian war since its beginning and had even aided
writers like Franz Fanon in their efforts to publish. But with the new developments of 1958,
they mobilized to condemn what appeared to them to be a rising fascist French state. In what
became known as Le manifeste de 121, or The Manifesto of the 121, many philosophers,
journalists, historians, artists, and psychologists voiced their disgust for the Algerian war and
the conduct of the French government. Signed and organized by highly influential figures
like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, the manifesto states,
Is it necessary to remind our readers that, fifteen years after the destruction of the
Hitlerian order, French militarism, responding to the pressures of this war, has
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succeeded in restoring torture and in once again turn it into something like a European
institution? It is in these conditions that many Frenchmen have come to question the
meaning of traditional values and obligations . . . The cause of the Algerian people,
which is making a decisive contribution to the downfall of the colonial system, is the
cause of all free men.206
The manifesto bolstered support for programs like the “suit-case carriers” who transported
money through metropolitan France and eventually to the FLN for the purchase of arms.
Thus, even public opinion in France itself began to turn against the continuation of the
French-Algerian war and added to the widely held sentiment that the country was on the
verge of internal rupture. In response, de Gaulle had to begin to admit that liquidating his
country’s colonial power may be, in fact, more to his advantage, regardless of the
expectations of the Pieds-Noirs and supporters of l’Algérie française. By the time he
assumed the presidency in late 1958, de Gaulle began envisioning the decolonization of
Algeria.

The Tumultuous 60s and the Rocky Road to Decolonization
At the end of 1959, and in early 1960, President de Gaulle strategically shifted away
from the concept of “French Algeria” and moved towards a program of “association.” He
defined this plan as his goal to create “an Algeria that will be pacified and transformed,
developing its personality itself and closely associated with France.”207 It was the first time a
head political official in the French government had hinted at the establishment of an
“Algerian Algeria.” De Gaulle recognized that colonialism was dying all over the world,
forcing France “in the spirit of the century” to let go of her North African territories.208 In
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addition, President de Gaulle expressed that he had never believed that “assimilation” into
French culture was ever possible for Algerians and explained his fear for what would happen
if it was ever achieved:
Arabs are Arabs, Frenchmen are Frenchmen. Do you believe that the French body
could absorb ten million Muslims, who tomorrow will be twenty million and the day
after that forty?. . . My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux Eglises
but Colombey-les-Deux Mosquées!209
Here President de Gaulle conveys a growing anxiety of the time. The Algerian immigrant
population of France had bloomed since World War II due to a demand for hard labor to
rebuild destroyed cities. In fact, since the beginning of the Algerian war in 1954, the
population saw a 25% increase and hit 400,000. Meanwhile, as violence continued between
the French army forces unwilling to give up in Algeria and FLN soldiers who vowed to fight
until their independence was recognized, de Gaulle decided to oversee a referendum in
January of 1961 in an attempt to hasten decolonization.210 Voters were asked to consider
whether they agreed with President de Gaulle’s plan to allow for Algerian self-determination
and with his sentiment that the colony “costs us much more than it is worth to us.”211 The
results showed the proof of public opinion against the war – 76.25% voted in favor of the
autonomy of Algeria.212 The leaders of the Algerian revolutionary movement began to
prepare for the international recognition of their new nation.
In 1958, the FLN had proclaimed the formation of the Provisional Government of the
Algerian Republic, or the GPRA.213 By 1961, with no end of war in sight, President de
Gaulle and the French government agreed to enter into peace negotiations with the GRPA. In
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May at Evian, Switzerland, the discussion about terms for a ceasefire and the creation of an
“Algerian Algeria” began its complicated course.214 In the first round of talks the GRPA
made it clear they desired full public recognition and that French colonists would not be
granted dual citizenship after independence. Instead Pieds-Noirs would either have to leave
Algeria or apply to become nationals. The French government offered its support if violence
against the colonist population ended and if France was allowed continued sovereignty in the
Sahara.215 Oil reserves had been found there and the French delegation wanted to maintain
influence over the region, even after independence. The Algerian representatives refused, and
the first “Evian Accords” ended with many issues unresolved. Even though the Algerian
press condemned the Gaullist government for attempting to only partially decolonize their
country, it did applaud the fact the discussion had even been opened. It illustrated that the
French state had begun to recognize the legitimacy of an Algerian government. However,
back in Paris, interactions between anti-colonial Algerian protestors and the French state
were less diplomatic. In the fall of 1961, the Algerian quartier of Paris was put under
surveillance and subject to a curfew that restricted movement between 8:30pm to 5:30am (not
unlike restrictions that had been Algiers).216 The immigrant population that President de
Gaulle feared would continue to grow, was becoming restless under prejudiced rules applied
to them, but not other Parisians. So, on the night of October 17, thousands of Algerian
laborers organized for a demonstration in solidarity with nationalists fighting against the
French army. The protest was peaceful, until Parisian police forces arrived and responded
with extreme brutality. 217 The clash angered FLN leaders and made them question the
resolve of the French government to find peace terms.
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The Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon, would officially report only three Algerian
deaths that night, all attributed to self-defense. Some 11,500 people were arrested for
participating in the pro FLN demonstration and put through questioning.218 But many, both
immediately after and to this day, would come to take issue with Papon’s account of the
event. Many witnesses on the night of October 17 reported that they had seen police officers
“hoisting demonstrators up over the parapets of the city’s bridges and dropping them into the
Seine.” Their statements were corroborated when “in the days that followed, dozens of
unidentified bodies were pulled from the Seine and deposited at the morgue.”219 Many
immigrant families filed missing-persons reports, but never found out what had happened to
their relatives after the protest. Due to the fact that the French police force and government
attempted to cover up the true level of brutality used against Algerian protestors that night,
there is no accurate estimate of how many actually died. At the time, the FLN estimated as
many as two hundred, while more conservative sources say 32.220 President de Gaulle’s plan
to hold his country together appeared to be failing, and as a distraction tactic he attempted to
push forward with the Evian accords. Cooperation with the FLN however would prove
complicated for the remainder of 1961 -- the tragic events of October 17 were not the only
road block to continued discussions for peace. In Algeria, a coalition formed between French
military personnel and Pieds-Noirs in an attempt to thwart de Gaulle’s plans for
decolonization. European activists formally established what they called the Organisation de
l’Armée Secrète or the OAS, led by some of the most prominent French generals of the
Algerian war. They refused to recognize their President’s plan for decolonization regardless
of the national referendum, swearing to carry out terrorist attacks modeled after the FLN’s
tactics.221
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The OAS Fights Back
On April 22, 1961, members of the top military command of the French army who
had been stationed in Algeria attempted to defy their president.222 The putsch was organized
by Generals Gambiez, Challe, Jouhaud, Zeller, and Salan who in their first act arrested de
Gaulle’s key representatives in Algiers. In the name of military honor and to maintain a
colony they had been fighting to keep under their influence for seven years, the men declared
publically their plan for a three-month military operation. Their goal was not political control,
but to keep the FLN from gaining command of what they believed to be France’s territorial
possession in North Africa, and to ensure “that their dead had not died for nothing.”223 The
military leaders felt it was their responsibility to protect Pieds-Noirs living in Algeria, along
with pro-French Muslims who would be subject to the terror of the FLN if left unprotected.
In mainland France, public opinion against the overthrow was strong. Most political groups,
regardless of their differences, were outraged by the creation of the OAS. Within the army
itself, only a fraction of soldiers posted in Algeria answered the call of the rebellious
generals, while the rest remained loyal to President de Gaulle who denounced all orders given
by the OAS.224 The coup was an incredible blow to the treaty talks which had begun with the
FLN, and de Gualle wanted the betrayal crushed as quickly as possible. Clashes between
loyal French forces, members of the OAS, and soldiers of the FLN raged on for months as the
French government failed to call a lasting ceasefire. By September of 1961, the OAS
escalated, carrying out attacks in Algeria such as machine-gunning Algerian cafes and killing
random Algerian civilians, while also initiating attacks in mainland France. An assassination
attempt against President de Gaulle was organized but failed.225 The climate of fear fostered
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by the OAS in 1961 would bleed into 1962 during what became known as “The Battle of
Paris”.
In January of 1962 alone, there were 48 OAS bombings in Paris. The attacks
specifically targeted those figures in the metropole who supported Algerian independence,
many of whom had signed Le manifeste de 121, like Jean-Paul Sartre. However, in February
of that year, one instance truly turned the public against the project of the OAS. The
organization blew up the home of Culture Minister André Malraux, who fortunately was not
home at the time. However, the blast horrifically injured the four-year-old daughter of
Malraux’s neighbor, Delphine Renard. The French press plastered the city with images of the
young girl in the aftermath, and it was her tragedy that truly sparked mass protest against the
OAS.226 In response, during the fall of 1962, thousands of Parisian students marched for
peace in the name of Delphine Renard. As many as 10,000 gathered around the Bastille on a
December night chanting “OAS-As-sas-sins” in defiance of a ban on political gatherings that
had been called by the Minister of the Interior with the hope of defusing tensions.227 The
police once again responded with extreme brutality and many of the young demonstrators
rushed to find refuge in the Charonne Metro station. But it was locked, and as a result, in the
mayhem, eight people were crushed in their attempt to flee the batons of the police. This apex
of violence in Paris put even further pressure on de Gaulle to reconvene the Evian talks and
to reach an agreement for a ceasefire with Algeria.228

Conclusion: Independence is declared
Finally, on March 7, 1962 after eight years of conflict, an agreement was signed at
Evian.229 The accord was so complicated that the document written by GRPA and French
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government officials came to a lengthy 93 pages. The final decisions outlined a plan for
cooperation between the two countries and would be both criticized and applauded on both
sides. Algeria was given full independence and the right to self-determination, but
begrudgingly accepted France’s demands for influence in the Sahara. While the Algerian
government would have full sovereignty over petroleum reserves found there, it was agreed
that Algeria would give French petroleum companies preferential treatment in trade. France
was also given the right to maintain a small military presence in the country. Fears of the rise
of a French post-colonialist system led to many disagreements between Algerian officials
with concerns to these concessions. However, it was deemed a necessary loss in the face of
the prospect of France’s recognition of Algeria as a completely independent nation, free from
colonial politics.230 With regards to the ever-defiant OAS, its “secret army” refused to
capitulate until four months later in June of 1962.231 As for the groups they had vowed to
protect, the future was unclear. For the Pied-Noir population, they were forced to decide
whether to stay in Algeria or flee to France where by the majority of the population, they
were stereotyped as fascist and racist. Their humiliation became known as l’exode, or the
exodus, as many did eventually cross the Mediterranean to seek the refuge of la mère patrie.
Large numbers of those who stayed were attacked or murdered through rampant vigilante
justice carried out by former FLN soldiers and angry Algerian civilians.
The betrayal felt by the former colonist population, (which felt abandoned both by the
Algerian nation and by the French government) cut deep and fostered a stark conservative
politics among repatriates upon their return to France.232 The French government did
however, make effort to frame Pieds-Noirs as moral, Christian family units who in fact never
left their ancestral home to make it easier for them to “reintegrate.”233 But for those Muslim
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Algerians who had supported French colonialism and fought on the side of French forces, the
consequences were far more severe. These “traitors,” known as les Harkis, were murdered in
the thousands by victorious forces in Algeria after the Evian accords. For those who escaped
to France along with the Pieds-Noirs, they faced a lack luster welcome, racism, and a lack of
economic support in the metropole. Finding housing and resources for the thousands of
refugees that flooded France after the war was a disorganized failure. In all, there had been a
million French in Algeria in 1961. Just four years later that number had been reduced to as
few at 70,000.234 But regardless of the changes brought by decolonization, the legacy of
French colonialism in Algeria has gone relatively unaddressed and has bled into
contemporary relationships between the two countries.
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Chapter 3: The Civilizing Mission Comes to the Metropole
After considering this history which is not widely known, taught, or incorporated in
modern academic discourse, it is important to contemplate what legacy it has left behind. The
scars of colonial subjugation and war are today remembered, or forgotten, in order to spread
certain cultural, political, and social agendas in mainland France. In this chapter, I will
exhibit the consequences of the memory, nostalgia, and historiography of French colonialism
in Algeria – all of which play pertinent roles in the lives of Algerian immigrants and their
descendants today in France. Algerians who relocated to France immediately after World
War II, during or following the war for independence, and in the more recent past during the
civil war that rocked Algeria in the 90s, are witnessing a reemergence of the past. It appears
that as the number of French citizens of Algerian descent grow, so too does islamophobia,
racism, political subjugation, prejudicial violence, economic disenfranchisement, and
relegation to second citizenship. Many of these struggles have evolved from those faced by
their parents, grandparents, and ancestors, giving new life to colonial structures in recent
decades. The same civilizing mission and colonial war that France imposed on Northern
Africa now waits for immigrants and their descendants on the very shores from which it
originated. Thus, we must speak of a neo-colonial system present in modern day France and
what some call the “colonialism boomerang,” or the returning of colonial violence to its
home address. I argue that the structure of the new civilizing mission, focused on defining
what it means to be or become “French,” has brought the vestiges of colonial war to the
streets of Paris, Bordeaux, and Nice. The way that the colonial history of Algeria is
remembered or forgotten has led to the exclusion and alienation of Algerians living in France,
constructing a new system of right-wing extremism and violent terrorism. These
developments hail from the past two centuries of traumatic colonial history which are being
avoided with tangible consequences.
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In 2006, the very same Henri Alleg who wrote the explosive account La Question,
collaborated with other academics specializing in colonial Algeria to create a collection of
essays, Algeria and France: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia 1800-2000. The goal of these
intellectuals was to analyze the legacy left behind by the Algerian war and to investigate how
the topic is approached today in France. This had become necessary in response tensions
created by immigration debates and public testimonies about torture that rose to the surface in
the early 2000s. Alleg claims that the subject of colonialism and war in Algeria (especially
with regards to torture) are taboo and often not discussed in modern day France due to the
fact that the “embers still burn.”235 He outlines the complexity of the issue of anti-Arab
racism in modern day France by listing the sheer number of players that form part of the issue
– the Beurs (or the verlan slang for arabe in reference to the children or grandchildren of
North African immigrants), the descendants of the Harkis, and then of course former PiedsNoirs and their families all play roles in contemporary conflict surrounding the inheritance of
colonial history.236 Each population has experienced being “Algerian” differently, telling
different tales of relocation to France or of their upbringing in the hexagon . The groups also
ardently claim different perspectives on injustices of the colonial period. The discrepancies in
the historiography produced by each group is important to dissect as Alleg’s colleague
Patricia Lorcin states, Algeria is as “vital to France’s sense of itself” today as it was to
Algeria’s identity during the era of colonialism. According to Lorcin, “who is entitled to
speak” on this relationship and the “fantasies of the past determined by the needs of the
present,” are aspects of the French-Algerian relationship that directly inform modern day
hostilities.237 Those “fantasies of the past” are playing out in all the same sectors once ruled
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by the civilizing mission – through education, economics, religion, and politics in modern
day France.
The Plight of Les Harkis
Before embarking on an analysis of the “new civilizing mission,” one must first
understand the experiences of re-entry or introduction to French culture endured by groups
who fled Algeria after the war. No case study is more telling however than the plight of the
Harkis, or the Algerian soldiers who fought to defend French presence and colonial power
during the war for independence. By the end of 1960, nearly 120,000 had served the French
army and had been frequently used as propaganda seeking to devalue the anti-colonial
movement of the indigenous population. As a result of their “poster-child” status, the FLN
targeted the Harkis with an intense ferocity during the conflict, often mutilating their bodies
as “traitors.”238 Most of the Harkis joined the ranks of the army for one of three reasons –
either they had suffered the brutality of the FLN, needed the money and amenities provided
by service, or were simply coerced by French army officials. Even though they were
considered a true section of the army, Harkis were seen more as workers than soldiers,
frequently tasked with projects that required manual labor. They were segregated from
French soldiers and were not armed as well as their European counterparts.239 By the end of
the war, the French government became worried that soldiers of Algerian origin may turn
against their superiors as it became more apparent that independence could be possible and
began reducing the numbers of enlisted Harkis. However, when the Gaullist government
entered into negotiations with the GRPA at Evian, the issue of what to do with remaining and
former Harkis was not addressed. The anticipation was not originally to relocate them to
France, but the concept was proposed as the FLN began seeking out the pro-French soldiers
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and murdering them in large numbers. It became clear by 1962 that the remaining Harkis in
Algeria were at great risk of suffering the “justice” of the newly autonomous Algerian
government.240 However, higher-up officials in France “were opposed to the possible inflow
of potentially a million French loyalists and their families.” General de Gaulle himself said
that if the Harkis were killed by the new Algerian state that it wasn’t his government’s
responsibility.241 This was juxtaposed with the French government’s willingness to readmit
Pieds-Noirs civilians, even those who had openly supported the OAS. The true concern was
whether or not the Harkis were considered “French enough” to be relocated to mainland
France due to their religion and ethnicity. It was even suggested that some among them could
be supporters of the FLN planning to carry out acts of terrorism in the metropole (no such
concerns were raised for the returning European settler population). In the meantime, it is
estimated that the FLN-run government killed some 100,000 Harkis on Algerian soil as the
French government debated.242
Eventually due to an outcry among French army officials who could not protect their
Maghrebin soldiers and also pressure from various political factions, the French government
assumed responsibility for a portion of the Algerian soldiers who had protected the tricolor.
About 25,000 Harkis were relocated to hexagonal France while another 63,000 desperately
sought entry through unofficial means.243 Once in France however, they found new hardships
even upon escaping the FLN – they were immediately segregated from European society,
many were even placed in former internment camps the Vichy government had used to house
Jews slated for deportation. Harkis and their descendants faced racism, economic hardship
brought on by workplace prejudice, and poor access to education. Caught between the title of
traitor to the new Algerian nation and feeling unwelcome in France, many Harkis attempted
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to hide their origins. Many families began naming their children French names instead of
ones associated with Islam in the hopes of sparing the next generation from anti-Arab
prejudice.244 As a population they were ignored and unrecognized as veterans – the Harkis
served as a stark reminder of the humiliation of the French state had faced in Algeria. In a
study done on the population and their families in the 1980s, one man said,
We were never liked. I am always an Arab. From all points of view, I am French, but
we are kept out of the system. We desire total integration, we should not be thought of
as immigrants. We have no rights, we are called Algerians.245
Thus, the Harkis had not only sacrificed their lives and their right to safely live in their
homeland, but were also denied entry into French culture. They could not shed the label of
“Arab” or “Algerian” even if they no longer identified as such due to the effects of widely
believed stereotypes in metropolitan France. It was not until the 1990s and early 2000s that
the Harkis population was regarded as full citizens by the French government and awarded
pensions, medical services, loans, and compensation for their service to the Republic. In 2001
President Chirac also acknowledged the fault of France in abandoning thousands of Harkis,
left to the retribution of the FLN. It is believed that Harkis and their descendants number
more than 400,000 today.246 However many of the struggles faced by Harkis right after the
war still go unaddressed today and are also endured by other groups of Algerian immigrants
now trying to achieve equality in French society.

Colonial Education Today
After the end of decolonization, the French government went to great lengths to hide a
history it viewed as shameful. The defacing of France’s humanitarian traditions, the
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accusation of war crimes, and lastly the military defeat of the colonial era all influenced a
systemic silence that has characterized these topics since the independence of Algeria.247 As
Lorcin posits, the “imperative of national unity necessitated their internalization until such a
time as their decisiveness would no longer pose a significant threat.”248 This began when
President de Gaulle enacted an amnesty law in 1962 to absolve all French officials implicated
in war crimes of guilt to facilitate the process of leaving Algerian colonialism behind. Later
in 1968, the National Assembly would issue another amnesty further blanketing the war and
ensuring that no one was ever persecuted for illegal activity in the Algerian war. Those
amnesties also covered the police officials who had taken part in the 1961 massacre of
Algerian protestors in 1961, effectively erasing the event from public discourse.249 In the
1970s and 80s as historians sought to write about the events of French colonization and the
Algerian war, they found their efforts blocked by the state which restricted public access to
archives containing pertinent information. In addition, since the framing of this history was
so contested by so many groups in terms of its framing, historians found it nearly impossible
to write an account with which both French and Algerian critics agree.250 With all these
roadblocks in place, widespread knowledge of colonialism in Algeria and its war for
independence gradually began to decline with the passage of time. This decline is best
illustrated through public school textbooks in France and how the history was taught to
students in the late 90s and early 2000s.
For a history that is so recent and so pertinent to France’s sense of self today, a
shockingly small amount of attention is paid to it in the national educational system.
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Throughout the 90s the amount of space dedicated to colonialism in North Africa and to the
Algerian war was gradually reduced as the public-school program was altered by the state. In
a study done in 1983 it was found that an average of 9 to 10 pages were once dedicated to
teaching students about the conflict. However, in a 1998 study, it was discovered that this
was dramatically reduced to 1.5 pages of text out of textbooks that were an average of 350 to
400 pages long.251 As far as the pressure put on teachers in the late 1990s with regards to
their focus on the Algerian War one teacher said, “I know that this year I’m dwelling less on,
let’s say on details, or rather on particular points. And the Algerian War, if we study it,
involves going into detail.”252 In addition, it was found that even though the Algerian War
was only a short 56 years ago, participants who are still alive are not invited to add testimony
to the classroom. The practice of inviting veterans to speak to students reportedly was used as
an educational tool in the 80s in some schools, but has stopped due to altered curriculums that
set aside little time for the topic.253 Perhaps most problematically, the issue of war crimes
related to torture (a central issue to this history) is all but ignored in the classroom for fear of
“inflaming the memory conflicts that exist and that one can detect in class.” 254
The effects of this systematic reduction of time and effort spent on teaching students
about colonialism in Algeria are two-fold – not only does it continue the cycle of erasing the
narrative of Algerian history which began with the co-opting of the educational system
during the era of the civilizing mission, but it also perpetuates the identity crisis or “the
Muslim question” first articulated during that time period. Descendants of Algerians living in
France today are not taught their own history, leading to what is termed the difficile
identification, or a difficulty identifying with either being Algerian or French.
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The eighteen-year-old son of a man who was thrown into the Seine in Paris on 17
October 1961 and who was witness at the recent trial in which Maurice Papon brought
proceedings against the journalist Jean-Luc Einaudi for slander, spoke of how he had
learned of these events: not at school, but more through his father.255
Students are shown in history classes what is means to be French, culturally and traditionally,
which may clash with their familial and personal experiences. In 2005, the French state even
passed the Debre 2005-158 law stating that schools were required to teach the “positive
aspects of the French colonial experience.”256 The law was quickly repealed a year later, but
the damage had been done – it was clear that the state preferred a specific sanitized version of
colonial history in Algeria be taught in the classroom. This erasure and censoring of the past,
especially when combined with a sense of not belonging in the present, leads students of
Algerian descent to question whether they qualify as either French or Algerian, or perhaps
neither. In ways reminiscent of the civilizing mission, the French school system enforces
only one possible way of “being French,” thereby rendering “unassimilable” those
populations with diverging cultural and linguistic heritages. This model of “Frenchness” is
even imposed in the cafeteria.
This year a debate that began a couple years ago in France is coming to a head.
Multiple politicians have stated that they do not believe that French public schools should
provide a pork-free alternative to students who do not consume it on religious grounds. In
January of 2018, Julien Sanchez, the mayor of the small town of Beaucaire in southern
France, actually took the step to ban the accommodation. A member of the Front National,
the 34-year-old states that religious exceptions violate France’s Republican values and that
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school cafeterias “are not four-star restaurants.”257 The public message Sanchez is trying to
send to the public is that eating pork is part of the French identity, and that if Muslims or
Jews do not wish to comply, they can choose not to have a provided meal at school. While
Sanchez claims his decision concerns maintaining French secularism, most see it as a specific
targeting of Islam that exacerbates a feeling of exclusion many Muslim students already face.
This debate began in 2015 in Dijon where the mayor of Chalon-sur-Saone removed pork
substitutes from school cafeteria menus. The case went to the court of Dijon where it was
ruled unconstitutional in 2017, as it was viewed to be a violation of the rights of the children
implicated.258 During the 2016 election season, the issue was also widely discussed when
Nicolas Sarkozy (hoping for reelection) also expressed support for banning special
accommodation.
If a little guy’s family does not eat pork and the menu at the cafeteria is a slice of ham
and fries, well he skips the ham and eats a double helping of fries. In a republic, it’s
the same rule and the same menu for everyone.259
It is yet to be seen whether the decision made by Julien Sanchez will stand in court. But
regardless, school cafeterias have thus now become courtrooms through which France is
debating its identity and whether youth of North African origin or who adhere to the Islamic
faith, fit into that mold. During the colonial era, the same question was posed regarding the
dual identity of Muslim or Algerian French subjects, and their capacity to integrate fully into
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French culture. It appears that the question of this “incompatibility” continues and is yet to be
answered.

The Modern Exclusion of Muslims in France
Following World War II when many Algerians were invited to the metropole to help
rebuild hexagonal France, it was not expected that they would become permanent residents.
They were welcomed by the French government as “guest workers” with the expectation that
after the war recovery labor effort concluded, they would return to their families in Algeria
with the wages they had earned.260 However, many immigrants remained, and quickly found
themselves at odds with the French secular tradition which relegated them to religious
invisibility. According to law, it is illegal to wear conspicuous symbols of religion in the
public sphere. The public sphere encompasses spaces such as governmental buildings,
schools, and political venues in which the absolute separation of Church and state is required.
While the law does not specifically ban any specific form of religious expression, it does, by
its sheer nature, single out the Muslim and Jewish communities who wear visible signs of
their faith on a regular basis. The issue of the Muslim headscarf or foulard for women came
to a head in 1989 “when three teenage girls were expelled from their public middle school for
refusing to remove their headscarves.”261 The case received a lot of media coverage and led
to a decade of confusion concerning the legality of Muslim visibility in French society.
Finally, in 2004 President Chirac created a law stating that certain religious symbols were to
be banned from public schools, including the Muslim veil.262 Immigrant communities,
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especially of North African and Algerian origin, were specifically targeted by this legislation,
further estranging them from French society. The young Muslim community in France has
been very vocal against such prejudice claiming it relegates them to a second citizenship
status and fuels an overall sentiment that while they may be full French citizens, that they are
in fact foreign. In an interview with a young woman from Tunisia, she explains that she feels
she is expected to let go of her religion to fully become French in the eyes of society.
France confuses assimilation with integration . . . Assimilation involves erasing. I
don’t want to erase my origins. I don’t want to forget that my parents immigrated here
from Tunisia . . . it means that to be French I have to eat pork and drink alcohol . . . I
am reduced to my social origins, my ethnic origins. And that’s a problem.263
Many members of the Muslim community are thus accused of fighting against integration,
whereas they are actually protesting assimilation. The young Maghrebin population is
simultaneously proud of being French while at the same time being rejected by the state and
framed as a threat to “core republican values.” However, the issue of religious discrimination
only became worse following the catastrophic terrorist attacks on the early 2000s.
After the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States
witnessed an extreme increase in islamophobia and created structures for national defense
that targeted Muslims in its territory. The same hysteria was felt in Europe, particularly in
France, which became more suspicious of its Muslim and immigrant communities. Not
unlike American news sources, the French media began aggressively portraying Muslims as
terrorists, solidly creating an association between the two terms. Police surveillance of
Muslim neighborhoods increased as did racial and religious profiling. By law the French
police have the right to stop anyone (including of North-African origin) for an identity check
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to inspect papers. People of Maghrebin descent became “six to eight times more likely than
whites to undergo ‘pat downs’,” creating a state sanctioned link between dark skin, Muslim
faith, and criminal activity.264 Specifically, the issue of the veil became even more complex
as the presence of the garment was seen as proof of an international rise in Islamism. Thus
the outlawing of its usage became a national security issue. By 2010, the French state went
even further in banning the usage of the burka on the grounds that it made it impossible to see
the identity of its wearer, which was considered a terrorist risk. The extreme nature of this
legislation was exhibited in a case in 2016 when the ban was extended to the “burkini,” or the
swimsuit version of the burka. In multiple coastal French cities, “photos of Muslim women
on beaches who were fined and forced to remove their suits flooded the news and social
media.”265 The Prime Minister at the time actually publically referred to the garment as a
form of enslavement. Thus, in the same way that the civilizing mission discouraged the
compatibility of Islam and French culture in North Africa, the modern French state is seeking
to further push immigrants of Maghrebin descent to the margins of society. In the same way
that the French army took liberties to search women wearing traditional Muslim garb during
the Algerian War under suspicion of terrorism, the French police are religiously profiling
Muslims on the metro and in public space today. Islam is still viewed as an archaic immoral
religion – a vestige of a colonial past we have lost track of. Such framing does not only come
from religious discrimination however. It also comes from the economic disenfranchisement
of Muslim immigrants and Algerian descendants today.
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Economic Inequality
Following World War II, France faced a crisis of destruction and desperately needed
manual labor volunteers to rebuild entire villages that had been obliterated by German forces.
Due to high casualty rates, manpower was scarce, and the metropole was forced to call upon
her colonies for help. North African families, in particular from Algeria, were invited to come
assist during the late 1940s and 50s, with the promise of wages and services to improve their
quality of life. However, finding housing was difficult, not just for Algerian immigrants but
also for French citizens in the post-war period. To give Maghrebin workers a place to stay,
haphazard residential communities called Habitations à Loyer Modéré (“rent-controlled
housing” or HLMs) were hastily constructed on the outskirts of Paris, packing immigrants in
tightly. Such buildings were dormitory-like with collective bathrooms and kitchens. Other
immigrants were forced to live in what became known as bidonvilles or shantytowns where
basic amenities were not available.266 Thus the newly formed Algerian community which
rose in size throughout the period of the Algerian War, was quickly segregated from the rest
of French society. It became clear that the Algerian immigrant population had planted its
roots in mainland France, creating an issue of proximity – many French workers did not want
to live near “Arab” communities. As a result, the French government adopted a system of
cycling housing that would make it possible for Algerians to obtain lodging but keep
different racial groups separate.
In some cases, white, French residents moved out of quickly and poorly constructed
apartments made undesirable by decay and disrepair, leaving space for the working
poor and immigrants . . . the semi-independent grand ensemble neighborhoods of
which social reformers dreamed often became de facto ghettos by the 1970s.267
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Algerians were barred from buying better housing both due to a fiscal incapability to pay for
better living conditions, but also due to a system of racism in which landlords turned families
away based on their ethnic origins. The resulting ghettos, or as they have become known, the
banlieues, still exist today. This is the modern-day version of the Kasbah, or the Muslim
quartier, completely separate from the wealthier, Pied-Noir communities that once existed in
Algeria.
The banlieues of modern day France have become a tense topic of discussion in
recent years. In 2005 it was found that the quality of schools in such neighborhoods lead to a
rate of failure two times higher than in wealthier corners of big cities (particularly in Paris).
The rate of unemployment among the descendants of Algerian immigrants was also much
higher than that of white French citizens. In fact, the Observatoire des Discriminations
published that people of North African descent were six times less likely to be hired than a
“Jean-Pierre” from a better neighborhood. In addition, familial revenue in the banlieues was
found to be much lower than that of the average French family, in addition to access to
medical services.268 Unfortunately these communities are also subject to police violence and
high rates of crime, which often lead to deaths.
Beyond the assassinations [minorities shot by the police], arbitrary arrests, routine
police brutality, and everyday forms of harassment . . . the reality is that a racism
rooted in the colonial and postcolonial history is on the rise in France because many
people, such as the children from immigrant families – including those who are
French citizens – are not considered equal but rather natives, living on ‘reserves’.269
The Algerian community in France is not only racially segregated, but also kept
economically immobile. Without many monetary options and desperate to make a living,
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many people living in the banlieues resort to crime, further feeding the immoral stereotype
given to them by the media and French government. In 2005, following the accidental
electrocution of two young men who ran from the police to allegedly avoid senseless
questioning, the youth of North African banlieues rioted against the inequalities they face on
a daily basis in Paris. Just as Maurice Papon had chosen to do in 1961, and the French army
in Algeria before him, the Prime Minister of France called for a curfew to be placed on their
neighborhoods:
After a series of mostly ineffectual pledges by French leaders to restore order and
crack down on vandals, the government invoked a 50-year-old law, dating from the
colonial war in Algeria, which gives local officials the authority to call curfews,
among other expanded law-enforcement powers.270
The descendants of Algerians burned vehicles, schools, gyms and stores to protest the reality
that the French state had made them “victims of academic failure, unemployment, and
idleness.”271 Their anger and violence is reminiscent of their Algerian ancestors who took
part in many protests in the old colony, including those at Sétif. The same educational,
religious, and economic discrimination that accompanied the old civilizing mission is still
being practiced today, including in the realm of politics.

Pied-Noir Right-Wing Politics Come to the Metropole
In colonial Algeria, the European settler population controlled local politics. It was
not until after independence that Algerians claimed their right to an autonomous government
and were able to repeal many of the discriminatory statutes that were put in place by French
colonists. However today, right-wing anti-Arab politics left over from the colonial era have
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taken a firm grasp of French elections. Starting in the 1980s, a political party named Le Front
National began gaining popularity for its anti-immigrant policy and conservative goals. The
party was led by none other than Jean-Marie le Pen, a former soldier and supporter of the
OAS during the Algerian War. Le Pen served in both the war in Indochina, as well as in the
Battle of Algiers during which he reportedly participated in the torturing Algerian prisoners.
In a statement in 1962 he said, “I tortured because it was necessary to do so,” but when
accused of such crimes by newspapers 1985, Le Pen sued for libel, claiming the Left aimed
to slander him.272 As president of the FN, Le Pen pressed for what he said was a loss of
esteem for family, army, flag, and country, quickly becoming well known as a staunch
nationalist. The same values, including the identification of France as a white, Catholic state,
hail from the fascist ideologies of the Croix de feu, the Vichy government, and the OAS of
colonial Algeria. On the national stage, Le Pen and his party were accused of being fascist,
anti-Semitic, and racist. As a result, the FN did not have much success until 1984 when the
party won more of the national vote than ever before on a platform of anti-immigration, with
strong support from regions where ex-patriated Pieds-Noirs had settled.273 The party
capitalized on growing fear of economic competition with immigrant or minority workers
due to the economic crisis and high unemployment rate of the time.274 Although the party did
not make it into the final round of the election, it was clear that the power of the FN was
growing and continued to do so throughout the 90s and early 2000s with the rise of
xenophobia which skyrocketed after the attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York.
By 2012, Jean-Marie Le Pen passed off the leadership of his party to his daughter,
Marine Le Pen who began a project of dediabolisation, or the “de-demonizing” of the FN.
Her goal was to make the party more mainstream and acceptable to a national audience that

272

Peter Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From De Maistre to Le Pen (London,
Routledge, 2002), 109.
273
Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 193-199.
274
Ibid.

Brown 88
had deemed it too extreme. To win over the public, Le Pen began using a lot of terms such as
laïcité (secularism), republic, identity, and liberty in her speeches. In this way, she sought to
convince viewers that her party championed the true nature of “Frenchness”.275 In an
interview with Al Jazeera in 2012 Madame Le Pen said with regards to immigration and
Islam,
I do not take Islam to be an enemy in any circumstance. I say that there is a major
problem of massive and anarchical immigration in our country which creates the
conditions for conflict, for the disintegration of society which disturbs our
indivisibility, our laws, including our law on secularism. I think that a huge majority
of French people agree with me on this.276
Thus, she frames immigrants, in particular those who adhere to Islam, as responsible for the
injustices they face in modern day France. Le Pen continues the interview by making clear
that she believes that the statues of secular law need to be intensified, only to then state that
France is a “Christian civilization”. Politically the goal of the FN quickly became the
rendering of North African and Muslim communities more invisible, catering to voters who
support more severe anti-Arab policies. However, Marine Le Pen saw the height of her
political career in the recent 2017 election in which her party won the highest percentage of
votes in its history. According to polls her support mostly came from blue collar workers,
rural dwellers, citizens from small towns, and those with low yearly earnings.277 Each of
these groups either see much lower exposure to urbanized, segregated immigrant
communities, or find themselves in competition with the Maghrebin labor force. But perhaps
the biggest key to Le Pen’s success and the perpetuation of the new civilizing mission, was
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her focus on the recent terrorist attacks that have taken place in France between 2015 and
present day.

The Colonial War Continues –Modern Day Terrorism
On January 7, 2015 two French brothers of Algerian descent entered the offices of the
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. Saïd and Chérif Kouachi shot twenty-two people, killing
eleven, and successfully escaped by murdering a Muslim police officer.278 The brothers were
seeking revenge for what they believed to be mocking, sacrilegious depictions of the prophet
Mohammed and Muslims in recent editions of the magazine. The magazine was accustomed
to receiving death threats and was constantly sued for its harsh illustrations and portrayals of
various minority groups (however it spared no sector of French society, including the
Catholic Church). But the violent act of the Kouachi brothers forever changed the discussion
of freedom of speech in France. In response to the attack, hundreds of thousands gathered at
the Place de la République in the center of Paris to chant, Je suis Charlie, or “I am Charlie,”
in solidarity with the writers linked to the magazine.279 The event resulted in a strong
reassertion of “the French identity” and isolationism which turned all immigrants into
suspicious individuals. Media coverage enflamed stereotypes, showing images of the
Kouachi brothers and emphasizing their family’s country of origin. In the following weeks,
“France witnessed more than 128 anti-Muslim attacks”, and the government began taking
steps to intensify national security measures.280 To combat rising islamophobia, many French
Muslim citizens began their own cry of, Je suis Ahmed, or “I am Ahmed,” in reference to the
Muslim police officer who was also killed by the Kouachi borthers.281 But many citizens who
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considered themselves français de souche, or “pure French” did not make the differentiation
between radical terrorist minorities and the average Muslim population. Long held
associations between a “terrorist nature” or “violent culture” and Algerian heritage left over
from traumatic memories of FLN terrorism, made it easy to frame average French citizens of
Algerian or Maghrebin descent as agents of radical Islam. The linkage of the colonial period
to this act of terrorism becomes clear when one considers the concept of the “colonialism
boomerang.”
Al Qaeda took public responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack, adding to
nationwide panic. However, contemporary analysis of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS have
been relatively shallow, not acknowledging their larger historical context and roots. The
media has sought only to focus on the violence their soldiers utilize in terror, rather than to
question where the origin of their doctrine and radicalization lie. What the Kouachi brothers
and the agents of Al Qaeda and ISIS are really fighting against is what they see as imperial
and colonial oppression wrought by countries like the United States, Great Britain, and
France.
Awareness of the colonial past, bitterness as to post-colonial dynamics and resentment
towards the local repressive regimes were carried over and linked to contemporary
situations wherein the notion of revenging occupation and manipulation was featured
regularly in the pronouncements of almost all the actors associated with Al Qaeda and
IS.282
Such terrorist organizations operate within a dialectic of returning violence to the sender,
whether in the war-torn countries of the Middle East or in the heart of metropolitan France.
This mindset was illustrated in an interview conducted between Chérif Kouachi and a
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journalist on the French television news channel, BFM while on the run. The journalist seeks
to uncover Kouachi’s motives and inquires if he and his brother have killed anyone since
their escape from the Charlie Hebdo offices. In response Kaouachi said simply, “We are not
killers . . . We are defenders of the Prophet. We do not kill women . . . We are not like you. It
is you that kill the children of Muslims in Iraq, in Syria, in Afghanistan.”283 It is clear that
Kouachi differentiated the violence of vengeance carried out by him and his brother from the
colonial violence perpetrated by western countries in the Middle East. However, the attack on
the Charlie Hebdo headquarters was only the first of a streak of events that have further
intensified tensions surrounding anti-immigration.
Later that year, on November 13, 2015, a series of organized attacks occurred in
multiple places around Paris. At the Stade de France soccer stadium, three suicide bombers
detonated their devices, followed by several mass shootings at nearby cafés and restaurants in
the eleventh arrondissement. In addition, at a concert at the Bataclan theatre, gunman took
fire on civilians, taking hostages and blowing themselves up upon the arrival of French
police. In all, the extremists killed 130 people, including several Maghrebin individuals.284
ISIS took responsibility for the coordinated attack, launching France into a state of
emergency that lasted several months. President Hollande announced that he would give
police forces the right to conduct raids without warrants, thus deepening nationwide
islamophobia and racial profiling. However, the spate of violence did not end regardless of
increased militarization. The following year on Bastille Day, July 14, 2016, Mohamed
Lahouiej Bouhlel, a Tunisian born French citizen, drove a truck through a large crowd of
people gathered for a firework show in Nice. He succeeded in killing eighty-four people and
injured as many as 300. ISIS once again claimed responsibility and nationwide debates about
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the “unassimilability” of North African immigrants and Muslims took center stage,
dominating popular media.285 In southern coastal cities like Nice which have high immigrant
populations, hate crimes against Arabs markedly increased. In both cases, ISIS proclaimed
the acts were necessary repercussion for French participation in airstrikes in Syria and Iraq.
While most French Maghrebin immigrants and citizens often don’t have direct ties to family
in Syria and Iraq, there is a strong sense of solidarity with Middle Eastern peoples who share
their faith and face the invasion of Western powers. For example, when President Trump
banned the entry of immigrants from Iran, Syria, and Iraq into the United States, a large
Maghrebin population in Paris protested, expressing a widespread sentiment that
islamophobia is rising worldwide.286 This pan-Islamism is reminiscent of the worldwide anticolonial movement that gained traction during the Algerian revolution, uniting countries from
different hemispheres under the helm of a shared struggle. They believe it is the rejection of
cultural citizenship that is radicalizing portions of France’s North African population.

Conclusion: L’Oubli and its Consequences
The question is now, does France have the right to shrug off its role in emboldening a
system of radicalization which has motivated many of the French citizens involved in these
attacks? As the nation continues to relegate North African immigrants, descendants of
Algerian colonial subjects, and Muslim citizens to second citizenship, the “colonial
boomerang” continues to come around. The new colonial agenda has taken the form of
revisionist historiography paired with the imperialism of the War on Terror. Without
understanding the shrouded history of French colonialism in Algeria and in other territories
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of the Maghreb, it is impossible to understand the tensions that exist today and the harmful
stereotypes that linger.
In Europe, the legacies of colonialism still play out in hugely damaging ways: in
patterns of immigration that do not favor economic integration; in low education
levels for second-generation immigrants; in the social isolation of some ethnic
communities; in repeating patterns of exclusion rooted in colonial-era of who counts
as part of the citizenry; and in profound frustration at the failed promise of a better
life.287
The recognition of the historical context and the temporality of French colonialism, is
necessary to avoid the effect of amnesia – the false belief that the past is further removed than
it really is. French colonialism only ended a short 56 years ago and to ignore its everlasting
linkage to the present makes it impossible to address the systems of oppression it created and
that linger. Many historians term this phenomenon the “Algeria syndrome” with reference to
what became known as the “Vichy Syndrome” during the post-World War II era.288 Due to
the shameful and traumatic nature of the French government’s collaboration with Nazi
Germany, all historical evidence of the partnership was suppressed and left undiscussed as if
silence could delete it. Vichy was too complex and tense a subject to approach for a France
that was trying to reconstruct itself. Currently historians believe the same phenomena is
occurring with regards to the history of French colonialism in Algeria. Due to the fact
decolonization is in its nature an inconclusive process (in reality it leaves permanent traces),
France is dancing circles around the reality of its shared history with Algeria, alienating the
inheritors of that relationship.
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Conclusion: Memory and Selective Amnesia
Around the world, methodologies of remembrance are contested. Especially with
regards to historical trauma, different groups vie to put forth their narrative of choice about
what and who mattered in the past. France is just beginning its process of scratching the
complex historical surface of its colonial relationship with Algeria; the work of memory has a
long way to go yet. Not only in terms of international relations between the hexagon and
North Africa, but internally with French citizens of Maghrebin descent, more must be done to
acknowledge scars. As historian Jo McCormack wrote in 2007 this is a paramount issue
specifically in our current time:
At no other time in history has this process of coming to terms with the past been so
important – rapid globalization, enhanced communication, extensive migration, and
‘the acceleration of history’ have all ensured that the dramatic ruptures of war,
holocaust, and apartheid are important.289
McCormack posits that in a hyper connected world, both through the movement of human
beings and the exchange of information, active memory is becoming more complex and
necessary. This is even more pertinent today when one considers the recent developments
brought on by new forms of terrorism and nationalist reactions. It has become incumbent
upon nations to acknowledge history to avoid the resurfacing or continuation of past
conflicts. France is beginning to witness the effects of a festering tension between disgruntled
Maghrebin youth who refuse to continue to be called “foreign,” and young, extreme rightwing organizations who foretell the downfall of the “European identity.”290 Alarmist
literature circulating and enflaming paranoia concerning the rising tide of North Africans and
Muslims in France is drowning out the historical truth that the very reason for the presence of
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that population is rooted in past colonial projects.291 Since those projects were never fully put
to rest, they continue to resurface.
Stereotypes have not disintegrated with L’Algérie française. The old institution of the
bureaux arabes and its tactics used to infiltrate Algerian culture and Muslim doctrine can be
seen in methodologies used today by French police forces. The negation of Algerian history
by omission in French schools has taken hold in modern France. Economic racism that once
denied Algerians access to certain lifestyles and jobs in colonial Algeria is now the
contemporary cause of poverty among Maghrebin French civilians. The classification of
Algerians as guilty terrorists until proven innocent has been witnessed through the
militarization and special powers taken by the French state in response to the Charlie Hebdo
attacks. Today, a lack of recognizing the formation of a post-colonial regime in France is
furthering the exclusion of Algerians from French historical memory and society. In truth,
Algerian culture is an integral part of current French culture through its culinary, literary, and
musical influences. Algerians helped rebuild the French nation we know today from the ruins
of World War II. And yet the presence of Algerian bodies and Islam in French culture is
continuously erased and made invisible.
Fortunately, some historians are working to create a new historical consciousness to
fight for the equality of North African French citizens. In 2012 Pascal Blanchard and Nicolas
Bancel, two French historians who specialize in the colonial past, wrote a manifesto in
conjunction with politician, Françoise Verges. Published in the French newspaper,
Liberation, the piece was titled Manifeste pour un musée des histoires coloniales, or
Manifesto for a Museum of Colonial Histories.292 The signatories of the document call for,
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Since we are all the inheritors of this history, it needs to be transmitted through a large
cultural institution. A place to put these pasts in context and in conversation, where
the words and representations of ‘native peoples’ cross, the slaves, the colonists, the
migratory workers in the colonies, the immigrant workers and their children in the
Hexagon, the former soldiers, those who served in the reserves of the colonial armies,
the harkis, the repatriates . . . all French citizens, all of without whom France would
not be France. A place to inscribe the history of French society in global history. A
place innovative and necessary. An exemplary place.293
For those who spend their life work studying France’s colonial history it is becoming
impossible to ignore the absence of commemoration. The historians and activists who signed
this manifesto believe that such a large and impactful part of France’s history should be at the
very least made available to the public. They believe that the creation of a center of learning
or a museum could serve to enlighten the public and remedy the selective amnesia that is
contributing to tense relationships between the groups listed above. Such a project would
recognize the reality that all these collections of identities play a role in the definition of what
and who is “French” today, and that the rejection of such leads to violence and hatred. The
creation of a museum as imagined by Blanchard and Bancel among others is even more
paramount when one considers how France’s colonial past has been commemorated until
now.
Commemoration of the Algerian War and French colonialism began as early as 1965,
not long after Algeria was granted its independence. Sites and constructions paying homage
to French Algeria began slowly cropping up in southern France after many former PiedsNoirs and their families began settling there. In Nice a memorial was erected in 1973, “which
paid tribute to Roger Degueldre, former head of Delta commandoes of the OAS,” with the
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support of the local Mayor.294 In 1980 in Toulon, government officials even went as far as to
inaugurate a six foot statue of a slain paratrooper in honor of the French army’s effort to keep
Algeria “French.”295 The unveiling of this monument took place in the presence of 2,000
people, including many veterans and supporters of the new Front National party which had
just begun gaining traction at the time. This trend of the “conquering of public space,” as
Blanchard and Bancel term it, on behalf of those who are nostalgic for the colonial period,
continued even into the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically in 2002, a thirty-foot recreation of the
Notre-Dame-d’Afrique, or a Catholic church constructed by Pieds-Noirs in Algiers, was built
at Theoule-sur-mer.296 The mini-church was inscribed with the message: “For all those who
died defending French Algeria.” Perhaps what is truly worth remarking is that no
commemorations made to Algerian soldiers who were tortured, civilians who were murdered,
or immigrants who arrived in France to aid in the reconstruction process following World
War II were raised following decolonization. However, in 2005 a project to create a Museum
of the History of France in Algeria gained momentum and was slated to be constructed in
Montpellier. Unfortunately, this turned into yet another project to valorize a “positive
teaching” of the colonial experience. It was spearheaded by Daniel Lefeuvre – a historian
who frequently spoke against projects of “repentance” with regards to France’s colonial
past.297 But due to heated debates about the glorification of the French presence in Northern
Africa and in wake of the 2005 banlieue riots, the project was abandoned. It is clear that even
through physical recognition of its former relationship with Algeria, France is reluctant to
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depart from a stubborn narrative that places a complex and tense history in a simplistic,
positive light.
What is actually positive however, is that France has begun to recognize its past
history with slavery in recent years. A memorial to the abolition of slavery was created in
Nantes in 2012 and museums have begun committing space to the history of bondage.298 The
question remains, shouldn’t there also be consideration given to colonial history? However,
perhaps the bigger question to answer is, is it feasible to imagine the creation of a space that
avoids “reducing history to a single dimension” and that unapologetically acknowledges
France’s role in North Africa despite the current climate? Blanchard, Bancel, and Benjamin
Stora, among other historians, believe a space of education is sorely needed, but recognize
the difficulty posed by the “identity wars” taking place in France today.299 Their mission to
realize a site of colonial history is still in the works, but as of now, the writing and
dissemination of this history must do the heavy lifting. It is impossible to resolve conflict and
to avoid the recreation of old systems of oppression without first acknowledging them, and
then understanding them. As a friend of one of the accomplices to the 2015 attack on the
Bataclan attack told the media,
I’m not convinced that these authorities really have any idea as to what is going on in
these neighborhoods . . . Young people around here are searching for an identity . . .
but they get no help. I’m quite surprised with this display of force from the authorities
with no regard for the origins or root of the problem.300
The origins and the root of the problem are precisely what I have attempted to impart here – a
history that is propelling hate crimes and radical terrorism as it continues to go undiscussed.
The goal of the unearthing of this colonial history in Algeria is not to place blame or to
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shame France, but to affirm that ignoring it does not make it disappear. The Algerian War
and the legacy of French colonialism cannot be made invisible – the memories are written on
the walls of the banlieues, stitched into forbidden veils, and explode with the bombs of the
excluded.
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